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INTRODUCTION

Nonintervention is a fundamental principle of international law that
is based upon the sovereignty, equality, and political independence of
States.' It imposes a duty on States to refrain from intervention in the
internal affairs of other States. Although this obligation also extends to
international organizations, 2 the literature on this subject has tended to
focus upon unilateral intervention in internal conflicts, rather than on
intervention by international organizations.3 In the post-Cold War era,
however, it is the United Nations (also referred to as the Organization)
that is being called upon to resolve a myriad of civil conflicts,4 and the

1. E.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106 (June
27); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR 1st
Comm., 20th Sess., Annex 3, Agenda Item 107, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/6220 (1965) [hereinafter
Declaration on inadmissability of Intervention]; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-95 (3d ed. 1979); see also infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7; BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 293-95.
3. E.g., HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Richard Lillich ed.,
1973); INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS (Hedley Bull ed., 1984); LAW & CIVIL WAR IN
THE MODERN WORLD (John Norton Moore ed., 1974); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL
WAR (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971); John Norton Moore, Legal Standardsfor Intervention in
Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 191 (1983); John A. Perkins, The Right of
Counterintervention, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 171 (1987). The superpower rivalry which
characterized the Cold War, and the relative impotence of the United Nations during this era,
made this focus logical. See Secretary-General's Address at University of Bordeaux (Apr. 24,
1991) (on file with the author). This powerlessness was clearly relative, however, for the
United Nations played a role in a number of conflicts that were outside the immediate spheres
of influence of the superpowers. See THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING, U.N. Sales No. E.90.1.18 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLUE HELMETS].
4. Civil war, or internal conflict, has been defined in a number of ways. For instance,
Professor Sohn states that a civil war exists when two opposing parties within a State have
recourse to arms for the purpose of obtaining power in the State or when a large portion of the
State rises in arms against a legitimate government. Louis B. Sohn, The Role of the United
Nations in Civil Wars, 57 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 208, 208 (1963). Another definition
maintains that it is armed conflict between an established government and one or more insurgent
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focus is accordingly beginning to shift. 5 Interventions undertaken by
international organizations, as compared to unilateral interventions by
States, are for different purposes, 6 utilize different methods, 7 are clothed
with a legitimacy unilateral interventions lack,8 and raise additional legal
9
concerns.

movements whose aim is to overthrow the government or the political, economic, or social order
of the State. Roger Myers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations
Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 96
(1990). Internal conflict has also been defined to cover any movement which for economic,
social, racial, ideological, or other reasons aims at overthrowing the government by the use of
force and changing the structure of the State. Ellen Frey-Wouters, The Relevance of Regional
Arrangements to Internal Conflicts in the Developing World, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD, supra note 3, at 458, 459. In U.N. practice, it may include internal strife that
has yet to ripen into civil war, but nonetheless represents a significant threat to international
harmony. Internal conflict has also been defined as conflict within a State involving violence
between nationals of the same State. Oscar Schachter, The United Nations andInternalConflict,
in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 3, at 401 [hereinafter Schachter,
U.N. & Internal Conflict]. Internal strife will be broadly defined here to encompass all of these
definitions and to include all but minor, short-lived riots and disturbances that are not in
opposition to, or an attempt to transform the government or structure of, the State.
5. Paul Lewis, Peacekeeper to Peacemaker: U.N. Confronting New Roles, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 1993, at Al; Ian Davidson, Peace, But Not At Any Price, FIN. TIMES, June 19, 1993,
at 8; see also Thomas G. Weiss, New Challengesfor UN Military Operations:Implementing
Agenda for Peace, WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at 51; The United Nations: Heart of Gold, Limbs
of Clay, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at 21.
6. Evan Luard, Collective Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra
note 3, at 157-58. Unilateral interventions are generally to achieve the national interests of
the intervenor. Multilateral interventions, on the other hand, have sought to maintain international peace and security, maintain national sovereignty and independence, advance selfdetermination, promote and protect fundamental human rights, alleviate massive suffering, and
advance the economic and social development of developing countries. Schachter, U.N. &
Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 401. Of course, in the process, unilateral interests may also
be furthered.
7. Luard, supra note 6, at 159. Unilateral intervention can be forcible or nonforcible, but
the discussion has focused primarily on covert or overt military intervention. Until recently,
multilateral interventions have generally been nonmilitary or nonforcible military undertakings
that utilized peacekeepers or observers with the authority to use force only in self-defense.
The increasing use of multilateral military force has made intervention more intrusive and
more analogous, in this respect, to unilateral intervention. This development has prompted a
closcr examination of the legal parameters governing these actions.
8. Id. at 157-58. Legitimacy stems from the more collective purposes of multilateral, as
opposed to unilateral, intervention. Recent Security Council operations in Iraq and perhaps
Somalia, as well as a lack of action in Bosnia-Hercegovina, have caused some commentators
and Member States to question the motives of the Security Council. Such doubts could
weaken the legitimacy of military intervention by international organizations.

9. See, e.g., INIS L. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 181-90 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing the debate over the
extent of the U.N.'s legal jurisdiction to intervene). There is overlap in the international
instruments and customary international law principles governing unilateral and multilateral
intervention. The permissibility of action by organizations, however, also raises questions
regarding the degree to which aspects of State sovereignty have been ceded to the organization by its members and what measures are permissible under the constituent instruments
creating the organization. These are international institutional legal issues revolving around
the Charter as a constitutional instrument. Id.
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The United Nations is,' ° and will increasingly be called upon" to
intervene in many more internal conflicts, 2 on a much broader scale,
and in a more proactive fashion than has been the case in the past. 3
This reflects changed perceptions regarding such concepts as: domestic
jurisdiction, which seems to have further shrunk;' 4 "threat" to the peace,
which appears to be an ever-broadening category; and the mission of
the Organization in internal conflicts, which necessitates a stronger,
more democratic institution utilizing rules of law to the greatest extent
possible. 16 Against this background, this article will analyze some of the

10. E.g., BOUTRos BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY,
PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING (1992); Disunited Nations, FIN. TIMES (London), June 1 5,
1993, at 19; Paul Lewis, The U.N. Is Showing Promise as Poll Watcherfor the World, N.Y.

TIMES, May 30, 1993, § 4, at 3; Lewis, supra note 5, at AI; Polishing Blue Helmets, ECONOMIST, May 1, 1993, at 39. There are numerous situations where the Security Council is being
called upon to play some role, be it prominent or modest. Resolutions have been passed on
the civil strife in Liberia, Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan, Angola, and South Africa. Troops have
been deployed in Iraq, Somalia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Rwanda, and
Cambodia, with major undertakings in Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Somalia.
The Council is also playing a role in the reconciliation process in El Salvador.
11. See Brian Urquhart, Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse', 32 SURVIVAL 196, 200-01 (1990);
see also Weiss, supra note 5, at 51, 57-65; Alan Riding, Rights Forum Ends in Call for a

Greater Role by U.N., N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1993, at A2; Stronger Role Seen for United
Nations in Keeping the Peace, FIN. TIMES (London), July 17, 1991, § 1,at 4. Potential major
conflagrations are also brewing in parts of the former Soviet Union, Zaire, and Burma. See,
e.g., U.N. Criticizes Russia Claim to Sevastopol, UPI, July 20, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, UPI File; Georgia: Endangered Species Fightsfor Life, Reuter Textline, July
25, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File; Major Georgian Offensive
Reported in Abkazia, Agence France Presse, Aug. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, AEP File; U.N.. Special Envoy Arrives in Zaire, Reuter Library Report, July 18,
1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File; Paul Lewis, U.N. Panel Rebukes
Burmese Military Rulers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, at 10.
12. E.g., Paul Lewis, Europeans Urge the U.N. to Act More Aggressively to Prevent
War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at A16; Cesar A. Chelala, How to Punish Men With Unruly

Political Ambitions, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at M2.
13. E.g., Jonathan Moore, The U.N. 's New Mission: Nation-Building, L.A. TIMES, June
27, 1993, at Ml. In Cambodia, the Organization undertook a multimillion dollar operation
that included direct control over administrative agencies, bodies, and offices in such fields as,
inter alia, foreign affairs, national defense, and finance. The Organization was also responsible for protecting human rights. While assisting domestic forces in assuming responsibility
for all of these tasks, the Organization organized and carried out elections, disarmed regular
forces, and monitored the withdrawal of foreign troops. Financing of the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia Addendum Initial Phase of the Implementation Plan;

Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/46/235/Add.l. In
Somalia, the Organization has undertaken its first corrective chapter VII enforcement action,
which includes disarming militias and other portions of the population and rebuilding civil
authority and institutions in the country.
14. See infra part I.
15. See infra part Il.B.
16. See infra part IIl.
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legal issues entailed in U.N. intervention in situations of civil strife. 7
Part I of this article will examine the concept of domestic jurisdiction. 8 One of the principal purposes of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security, which in 1946 was thought
to essentially entail maintaining the peace between nation States. Internal power struggles and conflicts were thought to be within the jurisdiction of the State where they took place, unless they posed a rather
substantial "threat" to the peace.19 Thus, the drafters of the U.N. Charter
made sharp distinctions between internal and international conflicts.20
For instance, the Charter generally proscribes international, but not
domestic, conflict, 2' and the U.N. Security Council is accorded primary
responsibility for maintaining international, not internal, peace and
security. 22 The Charter also contains a specific prohibition on intervention in matters that are essentially Within the domestic jurisdiction of

17. A tension exists between the constitutional quandaries and the substantive dilemmas
with which organizations are designed to grapple. Constitutional problems consist of internal
matters related to the management and functioning of the organization, while substantive
problems are external issues requiring solutions. The dividing line between the two is not
precise because the nature and intensity of world problems determine the nature and scope of
organizational efforts, thereby defining the constitutional problems which emerge. CLAUDE,
supra note 9, at 83. The constitutional problems addressed in this article are raised by the
new role being thrust upon the United Nations by international events occasioned by the
ending of the Cold War. Professor Claude postulates that we must strike a balance between
obsessive concern with institutional problems, which make international organization an end
in itself, and exclusive concentration upon the substantive issues of current world politics,
which neglects the building of an adequate institutional apparatus.for international relations.
Id. at 84. This article attempts to meld both by taking into account both current trends and
long-term institutional needs.
18. The Charter of the United Nations does not refer to internal conflicts. Rather, it
refers to the domestic jurisdiction of States in article 2(7). Paul C. Szasz, Role of the United
Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345, 345 (1983).
19. The U.N. Charter states:
The purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and
security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in
conformity with principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1 (emphasis added). The peace to be maintained here is "international" peace. Unless there are international implications, the purpose is not to keep internal
peace or to intervene in civil wars. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS

59 (1946).

20. Because of this distinction, it is quite logical to argue that the United Nations has
little or no role in most internal conflicts. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Commentary on
International Law: Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903
(1992).
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4; ROBERT E. RIGGS & JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS

22. U.N.

CHARTER art. 24.

24-25 (1988).
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Member States, unless there is a need for enforcement measures under
chapter VII. 23
Domestic jurisdiction is a malleable concept, however, that is based
upon the current state of international relations.24 In the years since its
founding, the Organization's jurisdiction has been steadily expanding at
the expense of the domestic jurisdiction of its members, and in the postCold War era the evolution in this direction has escalated. Given the
numerous conditions that have historically internationalized internal
conflicts,25 as well as the recent Security Council resolutions on internal
conflicts in Somalia, 6 Haiti,27 and Iraq,28 civil strife of any significance
may no longer be "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of Member States." International peace and security are being more broadly
defined, and the protection of human rights is increasingly considered a
matter of international concern.29 Thus, intervention by the Organization

23. Id. art. 2, 1 7. Enforcement measures are permissible only upon a Security Council
finding that, at a minimum, there is a "threat" to the peace or upon a finding of a "breach" of
the peace or act of aggression. Id. art. 39. Consequently, domestic conflicts had to be a threat
to international peace before the Security Council could exercise jurisdiction. In practice, a
much lesser showing has sufficed. See infra part I.C.I. The domestic jurisdiction prohibition
would also forbid intervention by other organs if a matter is deemed domestic because it is
included within the general principles that guide the entire Organization.
24. See generally Advisory Opinion No. 4, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and
Morocco (French Zone) on November 8th, 1921, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 156 [hereinafter Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion].
25. The factors suggested by Professor Paul Szasz, former legal counsel to the United
Nations, include: major acts of international outrage during the course of the conflict; size,
intensity, and length of the conflict; likelihood of intervention by outside powers which might
assist either the government in power, the insurgents, or groups of countries assisting both
sides; actual or potential spill-over across international borders; classification as a colonial
conflict; significant violations of human rights; and subjection of some parts of the dispute to
international agreement. Szasz, supra note 18, at 245-51.
26. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992); S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814

(1993).
27. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841
(1993).
28. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991).
29. Religious and ethnic sensitivities abound, making foreign intervention, and the
possibility of sparking unrest in other States, more likely. Nationalism is exploding as colonial
and communist borders collapse or are challenged, thus causing instability and the likelihood
that internal strife in neighboring States may exacerbate. Intolerance of human rights violations has increased and apparently now includes failure to permit the delivery of humanitarian
aid. This last development may make it easier to bring internal conflicts within the purview of
the international community because a faction may simply attack relief workers or refuse to
permit deliveries of supplies. Serious and systematic human rights violations are no longer
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. What is controversial is whether the
Organization can forcibly intervene to protect such rights. See David Scheffer, Toward a
Modern Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992). Moreover,
given the impact internal conflicts invariably have on surrounding States, either because of
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should no longer be objectionable on domestic jurisdiction grounds.
Even where internal strife becomes essentially international, however, aspects of these conflicts should remain within the domestic realm.
Arguably, what makes these conflicts international is their impact upon
world peace or human rights.3 ° Consequently, the competence to choose
a social, economic, or political order is still within the domestic jurisdiction of States, 3' absent some grave "threat" to the peace. Thus, while the
conflict may be within international jurisdiction, the Organization should
deal with only those aspects that make the conflict international, and
measures that decide or coerce a decision on economic, social, or political matters remain impermissible. 32 Recent Security Council measures to
the contrary are problematic.33
After determining in Part I that internal conflicts are generally
within the jurisdiction of the Organization, Part II will turn to the specific acts that can be undertaken by various bodies of the Organization in
the exercise of this jurisdiction. Intervention by the General Assembly,
which has only a recommendatory role, is limited to passing
nonmandatory resolutions. The Security Council, however, can take

refugees or a spill-over in the fighting, it may be that where internal strife erupts, it truly is an
international matter and of concern to the international community.
30. One of the principal purposes of the Organization is to maintain international peace
and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 1,1 1; id. chs. VI, VII, VIII. The Charter also contains
provisions on human rights. Id. pmbl., art. 1, 3, arts. 55, 56. The travaux preparatoires
indicate that human rights ranked far below the protection of national sovereignty and the
maintenance of international peace. Tom Farer, An Inquiry Into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 188-91 (Lori
F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
31. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106 (June 27);
see also Declaration on Principles of InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations and
CooperationAmong States in Accordance with the U.N. Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declarationon Friendly Relations].
32. Assisting peoples in exercising their rights in these spheres is another matter,
although the distinction is not always clear. Compelling a particular decision on these matters
may also violate other Charter provisions, such as the provision on self-determination. See
Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 30, at 65, 83-84

[hereinafter Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force].
33. For example, S.C. Res. 841, supra note 27, appears to take a position on the legitimate government of Haiti and imposes economic sanctions until that government is reinstated.
In Somalia, the United Nations has militarily attacked and called for the arrest of one of the
faction leaders, effectively eliminating him from the political reconciliation process.
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 10. Nevertheless, the importance of these resolutions should not
be underestimated. For instance, the General Assembly can recommend the establishment of
peace-keeping forces. Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J.
151 (July 20). A series of resolutions, accompanied by the establishment of bodies to exert
pressure, can also have an effect upon internal matters. The measures taken against South
Africa provide one example. Luard, supra note 6, at 160. Moreover, the Uniting for Peace
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more drastic measures such as imposing mandatory economic sanctions
and mandating forcible military measures. 35 The Security Council has
jurisdiction when there is a "potential threat '3 6 (generally referred to in
38
this article as a "danger" to the peace) 37 or actual "threat" to the peace.
Given the indeterminate nature of the concept "potential threat to the
peace," only minor internal friction of limited duration may, in the
present international milieu, be outside the definition of "danger" to the
peace. 39 Almost all internal struggles can eventually become militarized,
and any military conflict has the potential of spilling over borders,
causing an exodus of refugees, or inviting outside intervention. 4 Consequently, internal conflicts may be prima facie "dangers" to the peace,
and the peaceful settlement mechanisms under chapter VI should be
made available to all parties requesting assistance in settling the dispute." One of the most difficult issues is distinguishing between a
Resolution permits the Assembly to act when the Security Council fails to act because of a

While use of the veto is unusual these days, it still exists, leaving some residual, albeit
nonenforcement, power with the Assembly. See infra note 241; cf Schachter, U.N. & Internal
veto.

Conflict, supra note 4, at 442-45.

35. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 42. It can also play a role in the peaceful settlement
process (chapter VI) and has residuary authority to discharge its responsibilities to maintain
the peace. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 3,
52 (Jan. 26).
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 34.

37. This useful terminology has been suggested by N.D. White to avoid the cumbersome
references employed in the Charter. N.D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 36 (1990).
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.

39. Since "potential threat" originally included only serious disputes, see generally
LELAND M. GOODRICH & ANNE P. SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE

OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (1955), defining "potential threat" may help

determine when internal friction really is so minor in character that there is no constructive
role for the Organization to play. Given the political constraints at work, and because
precedent is always an issue, the dividing line will emerge. Hopefully, Member States can
devise a scheme that will permit discussion and dispute settlement before militarization of the
situation.
40. For example, religious or ethnic ties may precipitate intervention. States may
perceive achievement of geopolitical goals by taking advantage of such crises. Of course, the
opposite result may transpire. No State may have sufficient interest in the conflict and the
country may disintegrate as a nation State, as in Somalia. The question then becomes whether
a situation which is of international concern is also a "danger" to the peace.
41. While no mandatory decisions can be taken under chapter VI, the extensive resources
of the Organization could be instrumental in heading off or resolving conflicts. BOUTROSGHALI, supra note 10, at 11-19. This does not preclude the use of regional arrangements,
which the Charter encourages. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54. These organizations have been
rather ineffective as of late, however. See, e.g., Marc Weller, The International Response to
the Dissolution of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).

Currently under the Charter only the State involved, other Member States, the Security
Council, or the Secretary General can bring a matter before the Organization under chapter
VI. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38. This article examines whether this option should also be made
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"danger" and a "threat" to the peace. 42 The need to sharpen this distinction is illustrated by recent events which indicate that the international
community is moving towards a new definition of "threat" to the peace
that requires something less than even the potential for incursions across
international boundaries.4 3
If there has been a shift from domestic to international jurisdiction,
the international institutions to which this jurisdiction has been transferred must be democratized and strengthened. This is the focus of Part
III of this article. As commentators call for a right to democracy within
States, 44 the time is also ripe to adopt these ideals in international institutions. As with unilateral intervention, intervention by a small body
that can authorize military force, and is dominated by large powers,45
raises concerns about the objectives behind its actions. 46 To alleviate
these misgivings, the Security Council mu'st become a more democratic47
body so that its decisions to intervene possess the requisite legitimacy.
Democratization might include expanding the Security Council and

available to entities in conflict with the government in power. U.N. practice indicates that
there is some precedent for insurgents to participate in negotiations under U.N. auspices.
Schachter, U.N. & Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 427.

42. This question is crucial, of course, because a "threat to the peace" permits the use of
mandatory nonforcible and forcible measures. See U.N. CHARTER ch. Vll.
43. Although this was also arguably the case in Southern Rhodesia, only nonforcible,
albeit mandatory measures, were taken in Rhodesia. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR, 1340th mtg.
at 141, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (1966). Moreover, the guerilla war against Southern Rhodesia
eventually drew in some surrounding States, indicating a potential threat at the very least. In
contrast, the Council has authorized the use of force in Somalia, although there are no
indications of any planned military measures against Somali territory or emanating from
internal Somali factions against surrounding States.
44. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right' of Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J.INT'L L. 46 (1992).

45. These nations can veto decisions against their own interest or those of their allies.
3; Roger Matthews, Arabs Urge U.N. to Impose Sanctions
See U.N. CHARTER art. 27,
Against Israel, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993, at 3; Israel on Its Own Hook, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30,
1993, at 37; Palestinians: Different Rules, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1993, at 42.

46. The impartiality of the Security Council has already been questioned. Security
Council resolutions on Libya's refusal to extradite its nationals for prosecution in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France have been criticized for using the Council to carry
out the foreign policy objectives of certain powerful members. Marc Weller, Double Stanthe New World Order,
dards at the UN, 142 NEW L.J. 360 (1992); Marc Weller, Crisis fior
142 NEW L.J. 592 (1992). The U.S.-led war against Iraq may be another instance. See Burns

H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious

Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 523 (1991). Concerns of uneven enforcement were also
raised with respect to enforcing resolutions against Israel. David Hoffman, Arabs' Muted
Reactions Reflect Changing Times: Iraq's Importance Wanes after Gulf War, WASH. POST,

Jan. 18, 1993, at A21.
47. Legitimacy has been defined by Professor Thomas Franck as "a property of a rule or
a rule-making institution which in itself exerts a pull towaid compliance normatively because
those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process." THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER
OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990). '
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establishing mechanisms to consider and incorporate the views of diverse Member States48 and nongovernmental organizations. Norms can
be formulated not only in Security Council resolutions, but also in
General Assembly resolutions and declarations, which could help articulate the expectations of the wider international community.49 Consistency
and openness in the decision-making process, to the extent practicable,
could also assist in confidence building and in the articulation of
norms.5 ° Finally, there is a need for military contingents under U.N.
control, which could permit a more effective and efficient use of military force. 5' This could also help ensure that intervention is not a result
of the preoccupation of particular States and that the United Nations
does not refrain from acting because it is not in any State's particular
interest to intercede.
I. THE RECEDING CONSTRAINT OF DOMESTIC
JURISDICTION

A. UnilateralIntervention in Internal Conflicts
The sovereignty,

2

equality,53 and political independence of States

48. See W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J.
L. 83, 99 (1993). The views considered should come from States of varying sizes, at
different levels of development, and with different cultures.
49. Since declarations and resolutions are nonbinding, the Security Council's hands
would not be tied in any particular situation. Moreover, all Member States would take part in
this process, including the members of the Security Council. Interestingly, three members of
the Council are experiencing some degree of internal conflict or unrest: the Russian Federation, China, and the United Kingdom. Given the more general mood of cooperation, an
attempt to formulate norms, especially in solemn declarations, could go a long way towards
establishing a modicum of consensus on these issues.
50. For instance, explaining, either in the resolution or accompanying reports, why a
situation is a "threat" to the peace puts Member States on notice of the types of situations
which may pose a "threat" to the peace. Consistency may bring some long-standing internal
conflicts, such as those in Northern Ireland and Tibet, within the purview of the Organization.
See Myers, supra note 4, at 89-102; see also infra notes 104-10, 358-63 and accompanying
text.
51. BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note 10, at 25.
52. Sovereignty includes exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and the permanent
population living there. It entails obligations arising from customary international law and
treaties, both of which are based upon the consent of States. The jurisdiction of international
tribunals is dependent on State consent, as is membership in international organizations.
Accordingly, the State is the master of what transpires within its territory. BROWNLIE, supra
note 1, at 287-88. The State system reflects traditional conceptions of international law as a
body of rules made by and for sovereign States to govern their international relations. This
configuration is currently justified by the need to control international conflict and tension.
Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (1989).
53. Sovereign equality means that all States have equal rights and duties and are equal
members of the international community. States are juridically equal and enjoy the rights
INT'L
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impose upon them a duty to refrain from intervention in the internal affairs
of other States.54 This duty also extends to international organizations."
No intervention is permitted in matters that each State has a sovereign
right to decide freely.56 Intervention has been defined as encompassing a
wide spectrum of action, ranging from any interference in a State's
internal affairs, to dictatorial interference involving some form of military
force.57 With respect to internal conflicts, the discussion has generally
centered upon foreign military forces assisting the government or, more
problematically, the insurgency.58 While forcible intervention may be

inherent in full sovereignty; they have a duty to respect the personality of other States. All
States have the right freely to choose and develop their political, social, economic, and
cultural systems and have a duty to comply fully and in good faith with their international
obligations. Declarationon Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 122. This islegal rather than
political equality, however, given that States are manifestly unequal politically. R.P. Anand,
Sovereign Equality of States in InternationalLaw, 197 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 9, 103-04 (1986-11).
54. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106 (June 27); see
also BROWNLIE, supra note 1,at 287-95. The norm of nonintervention is well established in
international law. In numerous international instruments, including binding treaties, and the
declarations and resolutions of international organizations and conferences, States have evinced
the view that nonforcible and forcible intervention are prohibited. Id.
55. The United Nations prohibition against intervention finds expression in article 2(7),
which is addressed to the Organization, rather than to Member States. U.N. CHARTER art. 2,

17.
56. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 108; Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention
in International Lw, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 3, at 29, 31. In this
reserved domain, States may act with complete discretion because there is no obligation to act,
or refrain from acting, in a particular manner. John M. Howell, Domestic Questions in
InternationalLaw, 48 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 90, 97 (1954). Neither an international
organization nor an individual State may hold a State accountable for its actions, for the reserved
sphere is comprised of activities where a State's jurisdiction is not bound by international law.
BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 291-92. For example, the choice of political, economic, social, and
cultural systems, and the formulation of foreign policy, are within the domestic sphere. Military
and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 108.
57. Higgins, supra note 56, at 30. The element of coercion is the essence of prohibited
intervention. This includes force in the direct form of military action or in the indirect form of
support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State. Military and Paramilitary
Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 108. Intervention may involve a use of force amounting to an "armed
attack" under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Perkins, supra note 3,at 174. Similarly, intervention may involve a use of force constituting a violation of article 2(4) of the Charter, but not
constituting an armed attack. Finally, it may not involve a violation of article 2(4), but may
constitute coercive interference of another character. Id. Prohibited intervention includes the use
of economic, political, or any other measures to coerce another State to subordinate its sovereign
rights. Id.; see also Declarationon Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 121-24.
58. During the Cold War, the United States and the USSR often intervened in internal
power struggles to support the side most sympathetic to their respective ideologies. This led
to many discussions on the right of intervention and counterintervention. See, e.g., Perkins, supra
note 3; Oscar Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public
International Law, 178 R.C.A.D.I. 160 (1982) [hereinafter Schachter, General Course].
Intervention was also a lively topic with respect to revolutionary movements. See, e.g.,
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 121-24; John F. Murphy, The United
Nations and the Regulation of the Use of Force, in THE UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER (Christopher Joyner & Oscar Schachter eds., forthcoming June 1994); CHRISTOPHER 0. QUAYE,
LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 287-300 (1991).
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largely prohibited, other acts may be permissible.5
Internal revolt has historically been a domestic matter, and a government could quell it in whatever manner permitted by domestic law. 60 This
included engaging the assistance of foreign forces. Currently, however,
norms governing intervention by foreign powers are uncertain, the subject
of debate, and vacillate between several opposing approaches. 61 Classical
theory permits outside support for an incumbent government against
internal political rebellion or secession,62 but considers similar support for
insurgent contingents illegal.63 A contrary view stresses that international

59. For instance, humanitarian aid for the benefit of the victims of a civil war or economic
and technical aid that is not likely to have a substantial impact on the outcome of the war may
be lawful. Schachter, General Course, supra note 58, at 162. While U.N. resolutions on nonintervention do not elucidate what acts are impermissible, such specification has been suggested.
Id. at 161-62. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 125-26, the Court rejected
the argument that various economic measures -the United States took against Nicaragua violated
the principle of nonintervention. These sanctions included the cessation of economic aid, a 90%
reduction in the sugar quota, and a trade embargo. Nicaragua unsuccessfully argued that together
these measures were a systematic violation of the principle of nonintervention. Nonforcible
intervention may or may not be prohibited. See Damrosch, supra note 52, at 5; Declaration on
Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 121-24. Nonforcible intervention is not a violation of
article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial sovereignty
or political independence of other States, and thus the analysis is somewhat different. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion with regard to choices which must remain
free ones. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 98.
60. G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 253, 254-55 (1983). Incumbent governments have considered internal power struggles
to be exclusively domestic matters and thus outside the scope of international law. Yet
international law has increasingly intervened. Bart De Schutter & Cristine Van De Wyngaert,
Coping with Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Borderline Between National and
International Law, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 281 (1983).
61. Murphy, supra note 58.
62. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL
VIOLENCE: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 137 (quoting Edwin B. Firmage, Summary and
Interpretation, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 405 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971)).
Professor Murphy explains that this approach dominated during the 19th and 20th centuries
when aid to an incumbent government was generally regarded as legitimate. If the rebellion grew
in size and persisted, rebels might be accorded insurgent status, although this status did not give
rise to an obligation of neutrality by third-party States who remained free to assist the government, but were still precluded from assisting the insurgents. Only if the civil war endured did
it become permissible, and perhaps obligatory, to recognize a condition of belligerency. Upon
a formal recognition of belligerency, a duty of neutrality arose. This approach weakened as
governments began to base their relationship to insurgents on their political preferences, rather
than on legal criteria. It collapsed with the Spanish Civil War. Id.
63. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the Court held that there is no general right
of intervention in support of an opposition faction within another State in contemporary international law. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 109; see also Szasz, supra note
18, at 348; Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 113, 137 (1986). Professor Schachter comments that it is well established that a State
acts illegally by sending armed forces or material to support an insurgency. The Declaration
on Friendly Relations affirms that:
[e]very state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in
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law has developed a stronger emphasis upon nonintervention as opposed
to support for the de facto power.64
In State practice, it appears that States consider themselves free to
grant assistance to an incumbent government. 65 Yet most interventions are
defended as counterinterventions, i.e., as responses to prior illegal interventions by third States in support of the other side.66 This indicates some
doubt as to contemporary opinio juris on the legality of certain interventions in internal conflict. 67 The International Court of Justice, however,
seems to recognize the right of individual States to intervene on the side
of the legitimate government.68 Nevertheless, the Court might not sanction
assistance to a government where outside support would violate the right
of self-determination or threaten the political independence of the State. 69
As Professor Schachter so eloquently put it:
No state today would deny the basic principle that the people of a
nation have the right under international law to decide for themselves
what kind of government they want, and that this includes the right
to revolt and to armed conflict among competing groups. For a
foreign State to support, with "force", one side or the other in an
internal conflict is to deprive the people in some measure of their
fight to decide the issue by themselves."'

organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,
when the acts referred to

. .

.involve a threat or use of force.

Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 123. There may be an exception for

assisting an insurgency in wars of national liberation against a disfavored government, such as
South Africa. Murphy, supra note 62, at 136. The Declarationon FriendlyRelations, in discuss-

ing equal rights and self-determination of peoples, states that if a State violates its duty to refrain
from forcible action that deprives peoples subject to alien domination of their right to selfdetermination, such peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at
121-24. See generally Quaye, supra note 58.

64. Perkins, supra note 3, at 183-91.
65. Murphy, supra note 58. This assistance includes providing arms, military training, and
even combat forces.
66. Schachter, General Course, supra note 58, at 160. Perkins, supra note 3, at 172-73.
67. See Perkins, supra note 3, at 173.
is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non68. The Court stated: "[I]t
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already permitted at the request of the
government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition." Military and
Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 14, 126; see also Perkins, supra note 3, at 175, 194.
69. Perkins, supra note 3, at 195; Rein Mullerson, Intervention by Invitation, in LAW AND
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 30, at 127; see also Declaration on

Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 122, which states that every State has the duty to refrain
from any forcible action which deprives peoples of the right to self-determination, freedom, and
independence.
70. Schachter, GeneralCourse, supranote 58, at 160. Nonintervention would be in keeping
with political independence because outside support would be contrary to the right of the people
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Consequently, most would agree that when an insurgency occurs on a
large scale, neither side should receive outside assistance because it
violates the political independence of the State. 7 If, however, a conflict
does not rise to the level of widespread civil war, there is greater disagreement.72
The heart of the problem with regard to outside intervention in support
of an incumbent government against a popular uprising is the substantial
threat to the right of self-determination, 73 and the political independence

to decide the issue for themselves. Id. Thus, although governments may generally have the right
to give and receive military assistance, such support may be impermissible in these circumstances. Mullerson, supra note 69, at 132-33; John L. Hargrove, Intervention by Invitation
and the Politics of the New World Order, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ORDER, supra note 30, at 113.
71. See Schachter, General Course, supra note 58, at 160. "Large scale" would mean it
involves a substantial number of people or control of significant areas of the country by
opposing forces. States do not challenge this principle; rather, they rely upon the doctrine of
counterintervention - that is, one side has already received outside support - to justify
intervention to assist the other side. Id.; Mullerson, supra note 69, at 127-34.
72. Governments continue to defend the legality of assistance to other governments, and
there is no clear prohibition against it. For instance, in response to its invasion of Grenada, the
United States declared that the lawful government of a State may invite outside military
assistance to deal with internal disorders as well as external threats. Mullerson, supra note 69,
at 132. Moreover, many Western scholars might agree that international law does not forbid
rendering military assistance at the request of the legitimate government with the aim of
restoring internal disorder. Id. Professor Schachter cautions, however, that in these circumstances, there should be a heavy burden on the intervening government to demonstrate that
its use of force has not infringed upon the right of the people to determine their political system
and their government. Schachter, General Course, supra note 58, at 160. On the other hand,
the Institut de Droit International declared in 1975 that States should refrain from giving
assistance to all parties in a civil war in another State. Mullerson, supra note 69, at 132. The
Declarationon the Inadmissibility of Intervention also declares that States should not interfere
in situations of civil strife in other States. Declarationon Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra
note 1. The Declarationon Friendly Relations is not clear. While it declares that States are not
forcibly to intervene to deprive dependent peoples from exercising their right to self-determination, it appears to permit intervention to assist those peoples in certain circumstances. On the
other hand, States are to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in acts
of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State. Declarationon Friendly Relations, supra note
31.
73. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, IN 2, arts. 55, 56; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 1,993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 1,999 U.N.T.S. 171. There is some controversy
about the content of the right to self-determination outside of the colonial context, where it is
generally accepted. Once peoples are free from colonial domination, there is debate as to
whether self-determination extends to secession from an independent State. The opposing
principle, of course, is territorial sovereignty and the Declaration on Friendly Relations
illustrates this tension. Because many claims to secession are emerging and, given that the
artificiality of many colonial and other political boundaries will probably continue to surface,
these principles are being explored anew. See generally Deborah Cass, Re-thinking SelfDetermination:A CriticalAnalysis of CurrentInternationalLaw Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 21 (1992); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation,16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determinationand World
Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287 (1991).
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of the embattled State.7" If foreign military intervention restricts the
political independence of the country, or limits the populace's choice as
to the composition or policies of its government, such force is probably
impermissible.7 1 It is unclear, however, when intervention causes these
effects.
B. Domestic Jurisdiction Generally in U.N. Practice
Although the principles governing unilateral State intervention in
internal conflicts appear to be moving towards nonintervention,76 the
opposite may be true for U.N. intervention. While the Organization has
generally regarded internal power struggles as domestic matters, it has
intervened when these conflicts have had international effects. Even when
the United Nations has intervened, however, it has had different goals and
utilized different methods than unilateral intervenors. It has tried not to
violate principles such as self-determination, political independence, and
territorial sovereignty.77
Jurisdiction in internal conflicts also raises important questions
peculiar to the U.N. Charter, which directly addresses the question of
domestic jurisdiction. The Organization's duty to refrain from intervening
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of its members is set out in
article 2(7):
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this

74. Assuming there is no outside support for the rebellion, the very necessity of a

government's appeal to a foreign State for military assistance places the legitimacy and
continuing viability of that government in doubt. Mullerson, supra note 69, at 132.

75. Perkins, supra note 3, at 183-89. Perkins provides cogent arguments regarding the
permissibility of intervention to assist either side, and arguments in support of the erosion of
the traditional rule favoring intervention to assist the constitutional power. Given the principles
of sovereignty, political independence, and self-determination, it is difficult to discern how it
is permissible for foreign forces to decide who will prevail in an internal struggle for power.
Id. The fact that interventions are defended as counterinterventions, or as assistance with internal
disorders versus widespread revolt, indicates that the tilt is towards nonintervention in most
cases. Moreover, many questions have been raised as to the legitimacy of the government which
is requesting intervention or the actual existence of an invitation to intervene in particular cases.
See Hargrove, supra note 70, at 113.

76. With the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the United Nations as a more
effective force, unilateral intervention is likely to decrease. This will hasten the progression
towards a principle of unilateral nonintervention which may be conditioned, however, on an
adequate U.N. option. With the end of the Cold War, the theory of counterintervention is likely
to become largely irrelevant since counterintervention was primarily a theoretical construct to
explain the legality or illegality of superpower intervention in internal conflicts.
77. These principles are prescribed in the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER ch. 1.
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principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
78
under Chapter VII.
This clause symbolizes a source of constant tension between the Organization and its members: the extent to which State sovereignty is
relinquished by joining this international body.7 9 Consequently, article 2(7)
regulates the relationship between the United Nations and its members8 °
by prohibiting the Organization from going beyond vaguely-prescribed
boundaries.8 '
The exact limits of those boundaries are incapable of precise and
permanent definition, however, because domestic jurisdiction is determined
by the development of international relations, which is dynamic.82 Whether
a particular matter is domestic or international depends upon an assessment of the current state of international relations,83 which can turn upon

78. Id. art. 2, 7. This clause was intended to characterize the areas of inter-State life
directly regulated by international law, and to identify the range of competence possessed by
the Organization, which only possessed such powers as were attributed to it by the terms of the
Charter. Lawrence Preuss, Article 2, Paragraph7 of the Charter of the United Nations and
Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction,74 R.C.A.D.I. 553, 556 (1949).
79. By joining an international organization, which is a voluntary act of sovereignty, a State
assumes various obligations which are derived from the scope and character of the organization.
In assuming these obligations, the State transfers certain elements of its jurisdiction and certain
prerogatives of its sovereignty to the organization. Thus, simply by joining, a State assents to
limitations upon its sovereignty to the extent required to enable the organization to carry out
its functions and achieve its aims. DiURA NINCIC, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 26 (1970).
80. Doc. 1019, 1/1/42, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 507-08 (1945).
81. When drafting the U.N. Charter, the major powers did not want to be restrained in the
peace and security arena, but did want to prohibit the Organization from interfering in domestic
matters. This was especially pertinent because the United Nations would be dealing with topics
not previously regulated by international organizations. Accordingly, article 2(7) is included as
a general principle and made applicable to the activities of the entire Organization, rather than
being limited to the peaceful settlement mechanisms, as originally proposed and as was the case
in the League of Nations Covenant. RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER 900 (1958). Member States had to be assured that the Organization's interest in the
economic, social, and cultural spheres would not deprive them of control over their affairs, and
that the Organization would deal with governments rather than directly intervene in their internal
affairs. Preuss, supra note 78, at 578.
82. Nationality DecreesAdvisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 4, at 156. In deciding
whether certain nationality decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco were "solely within the
domestic jurisdiction" of France, thereby depriving the League of Nations of jurisdiction over
the matter, the Court found that whether a certain matter is, or is not, solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of
international relations.
83. Howell, supra note 56, at 91. For instance, human rights were within the domestic
jurisdiction of States when the Charter was written in 1945. Since that time, they have passed
into the international sphere. Higgins, supra note 56, at 26, 31. It should be noted that human
rights provisions were included in the Charter, thereby indicating some intention to include them
within international jurisdiction. Nonetheless, States considered them largely domestic matters
and it is unlikely that States anticipated direct intervention into the affairs of Member States
to enforce these rights. Although there currently is debate over whether force can be utilized
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political 84 or legal criteria.8 5 U.N. practice has favored a political
yardstick,86 and over the past fifty years, the trend has inexorably been
towards enlarging the subject matter considered by the Organization.87
Deciding whether or not a particular matter is domestic is a political
decision made by political organs, such as the General Assembly and the
Security Council. 88 Nevertheless, these decisions are subject to some

to protect human rights, it is generally acknowledged that the manner in which States treat their
citizens is no longer a wholly domestic concern.
84. Howell, supra note 56, at 92-93. Political criteria, which would include such theories
as international concern, discussed infra at part I.C. 1, are generally more subjective than legal
standards which are considered to be relatively more objective.
85. Legal criteria would include whether a matter is governed by treaty or by customary
international law. Howell, supra note 56, at 95. The Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion is
one example. Although nationality issues are generally domestic, a number of treaties governing
the relationship between France, Britain, Tunis, and Morocco indicated that the matter was no
longer solely within the domestic jurisdiction of France. NationalityDecrees Advisory Opinion,
1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B), No. 4, at 158-62. Any question can be the subject of a treaty, thereby
invalidating a claim of domestic jurisdiction. ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 63-64

(1963). Moreover, even utilizing this more objective criteria, it is difficult to argue that there
are fixed topics which are perpetually within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Id. Attempts
have been made to draw up a list of topics that are currently within the reserved domain, but
a characterization as domestic or international depends on the precise facts and legal situation
at hand as the Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion illustrates. See BROWNLIE, supra note 1,
at 291. The suggestion that where no formal international obligations exist on a topic it
automatically falls within domestic jurisdiction has been rejected; there may be claims based
on customary international law or the matter may have international repercussions. Howell, supra
note 56, at 95. During the interwar years, the objective definition of domestic jurisdiction
dominated, although international repercussions could remove a matter from domestic
jurisdiction. Id.
86. International law was rejected as the standard for making these determinations because
the major powers argued that international law was subject to constant change and would thus
make it difficult to define whether or not a given situation came within the domestic jurisdiction
of a State. Moreover, this body of law was indefinite and inadequate, and to the extent it was
dealt with, the concepts were antiquated and should not have been frozen into the Charter of
the new Organization. Many delegations rejected these views and thought eliminating a legal
standard was a step backwards because the Organization would be substituting a political
opinion for a juridical decision. RUSSELL, supra note 81, at 900-10; Commentators have also
questioned the rejection of a legal standard. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 56, at 31; Howell,
supra note 56, at 97-99.
87. MANNARASWARNIGHALA S. RAJAN, THE EXPANDING JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED

NATIONS. 168 (1982). Initial apprehensions that the domestic jurisdiction clause would impede
the work of the United Nations have proved to be incorrect. Instead, the Organization' s jurisdiction has been far reaching and continually expanding. There are few topics of international
concern or interest that U.N. organs have not dealt with in some manner, despite their impact
or origin in the domestic jurisdiction of States. Rajan asserts that matters of international concern
and interest are not treated by U.N. organs as a limited identifiable quantity, but as a perennially
open category into which subjects can be included or excluded at any time at the discretion of
U.N. organs, whether such topics were traditionally domestic or are wholly new subjects. For
a full discussion, see id. at 168-75.
88. Deleting a legal standard and omitting who should decide, are correlated; it moved the
determination from the juridical to the political realm. CLAUDE, supra note 9, at 182-83. The
major powers did not want to prescribe a method to apply the domestic jurisdiction clause,
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normative constraints. 9 Despite their political nature, legal standards 9° are
taken into account, along with the acute awareness that precedent is
inevitably being made.9 ' Consequently, while domestic jurisdiction has
become increasingly ineffective as a barrier to U.N. consideration of an
issue,9 2 resolutions are generally ineffectual when addressed to a matter
an affected State believes is within its domestic jurisdiction. 93 This
indicates that States still perceive some dichotomy between domestic and
international jurisdiction.
Views on what acts actually constitute intervention have varied
between two extremes. Some have defined intervention broadly as:
consideration of any kind, which would include placing an item on an
agenda; discussion; forming a commission of inquiry or any kind of

arguing that such determinations should be made by the organ involved, on a case by case basis,
just as in other matters of Charter interpretation. A number of delegations, however, considered
it critical to include who would decide. Some States thought this configuration would vest the
Security Council, a political body, with a juridical function while not binding it to a legal
standard. The major powers adamantly adhered to the principle of coequality of coordinate
organs, however, and refused to confer upon the International Court of Justice a power
resembling judicial review that is found in the U.S. system of government, although an advisory
opinion could always be obtained to assist in determinations of disputed competence. Preuss,
supra note 78, at 594-97. The travaux also indicate that the decision was to be made by the
Organization and this has been the practice.
89. Oscar Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations, 109
R.C.A.D.I. 165, 173 (1963) [hereinafter Schachter, Law & Politics].The objectives pursued are
generally believed to fall within the parameters laid out in the Charter and related constitutional
practice. Decisions are reached within the framework of a fairly well-defined system, where the
participants employ the common vocabulary of the Charter and utilize Charter principles and
purposes to justify their positions and conduct. Id. While governments do sometimes ignore what
is legally required, conceptions of what is legal and appropriate play a significant role in shaping
both the proceedings and the outcome. States generally believe what they do is required by law,
whether it is the law of the Charter, of international conventions, customary law, or general
principles accepted as law. Id. at 174; Cf. CLAUDE, supra note 9, at 171. Claude stresses the selfinterest of States in approaching these matters and the twisting of precedent to achieve their
objectives.
90. HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 48. These legal rules include specific treaty-based rules
based on consent to the Charter and general international law. In the course of its work, the
Security Council interprets its constitution, which in addition to being an international treaty,
also contains many accepted concepts of international law. Such usage and precedent may
develop into legal rules - norms which are accepted as binding by the vast majority of States
and by organs of the United Nations. Id.
91. See Schachter, Law and Politics, supra note 89, at 174.
92. RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21, at 25. The United Nations has tended to view matters
covered by treaties or referred to in the Charter, such as human rights or self-determination, as
no longer within the reserved domain. 2 LEO GROSS, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW & ORGANIZATION 1173 (1984). Nevertheless, many U.N. measures on these subjects have been
general in nature and not directed against a particular State in a particular situation. Thus, their
implementation depended on the voluntary cooperation of Members. RIGGS & PLANO, supra
note 21, at 241-42. This indicates that there are limitations because general resolutions, which
are not directed to a particular State, are not considered interventions.
93. RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21, at 25 (citing the ineffectiveness of the long string of
resolutions on South Africa); qf. Luard, supra note 6, at 162.
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investigation;94 or issuing a procedural or substantive recommendation. 95
At the other extreme, others have limited the definition of intervention to
"dictatorial intervention," a preemptory demand accompanied by enforcement, or the threat of enforcement, if there is noncompliance. Any action
falling short of this is therefore permissible.96
Neither of these extremes has been accepted in practice. Rather, a
resolution addressed to a particular State is viewed as intervention,
requiring a determination of whether it concerns a matter within the
affected State's domestic jurisdiction.9 7 Moreover, measures based on the
consent of the parties are not viewed as intervention.98 Mandatory
measures, or the introduction of any forces for any purpose into the
territory of a State, would undoubtedly amount to intervention.99 Nevertheless, in the case of recommendatory measures, consent would make
such intervention permissible.' °

94. For instance, some States argued that investigation of the Greek situation in 1948 was
intervention in the internal affairs of Greece. HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 70.
95. The most acute area of concern has been recommendations and resolutions, which are
the limits of the powers of the General Assembly. U.N. CHARTER ch. IV. If both are construed
as intervention, the authority of this organ would be.greatly circumscribed. If placing an item
on an agenda is intervention, any item which a State objects to as within its domestic
jurisdiction, would be removed from the General Assembly's purview. Since the bodies of the
Organization determine their own jurisdiction, discussion by a U.N. organ of an internal matter
or merely placing it on the agenda of an organ is not considered intervention. Schachter, U.N.
& Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 421.

96. HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 68. Adherents to this view favor a restricted interpretation
of intervention to promote the effectiveness of the United Nations. Because the General Assembly has no such dictatorial powers, no act by this body could be intervention. GROSS, supra note
92, at 1187. Since only the Security Council can order enforcement measures, in which case
the sole exception to article 2(7) applies, this interpretation renders the article 2(7) prohibition
a nullity.
97. Passing a resolution directed at a particular State may not seem to be intervention in
any meaningful sense. If, however, a succession of resolutions are passed and a committee is
set up to mobilize and exert pressure by every means available, a form of intervention does take
place. These actions are clearly designed to influence events within the State. Luard, supra note
6, at 162. But see RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21, at 25. Adoption by a U.N. organ of a

resolution addressed to all members or all States is not considered intervention. Schachter, U.N.
& Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 421.

98. Murphy, supra note 58. Consent does not legitimize intervention, however, if
intervention violates a Charter prohibition. The Organization may be precluded from undertaking
certain actions under its own constitutional law regardless of an individual State's consent.
Szasz, supra note 18, at 353-54.
99. Szasz, supra note 18, at 353; see also HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 68; MURPHY, supra

note 62, at 16; Luard, supra note 6, at 162.
100. In the case of mandatory measures under chapter VII, consent is not necessary. D.W.
BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 412 (1964). One of the essential characteristics of

peacekeeping is that these operations are established only with the consent of the parties to the
dispute. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 3, at 5-6. They are usually not chapter VII actions, but
rather recommendatory operations under the auspices of the Security Council or the General
Assembly.
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C. U.N. Intervention in Internal Conflicts During the Cold War Era
1. Internal Conflicts and the Concept of International Concern
In the post-Cold War era, the trend towards international jurisdiction
has escalated most decidedly with respect to internal conflicts, where the
United Nations is increasingly taking an assertive role. Yet, internal power
struggles have historically been considered domestic matters by U.N.
organs, except to the extent that they have had international effects.
International jurisdiction, almost from the Organization's inception, has
been formulated as part of the broad concept of international concern,' 0 '
which has greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the Organization. Domestic
jurisdiction claims have continued to be asserted by States. 102 Yet contrary
to what article 2(7) would appear to provide,'0 3 international relations in
the post World War II era have been at a point where something less than
a "threat" or "breach" of the peace permits the Organization to exercise
jurisdiction.
Professor Szasz, former legal counsel to the United Nations, has
enunciated various factors that, alone or in combination, might internationalize internal hostilities, and make them matters of international

101. HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 77. The development of this concept is linked to chapter
VI, where the Security Council can make recommendations regarding matters which are likely
to endanger international peace. As originally formulated, article 2(7) could defeatjurisdictional
claims by the Organization under chapter VI. It was only when the Organization was exercising
its enforcement powers, under chapter VII, that article 2(7) was preempted. Yet, beginning in
1946, with consideration of the situation presented by the Franco regime in Spain, the
Organization has relied upon the concept of international concern which has encompassed
situations broader than enforcement or even a breach or "threat" to the peace to defeat domestic
jurisdiction claims. Of course, international concern is open-ended and has been continually
expanded. It is often relied upon, however, as a subsidiary basis of jurisdiction in this expanded
form. Some have enlarged the concept to cover matters of importance or great international
importance - which is an inherently subjective standard. Others have found that matters cannot
be domestic because they are being considered by a large number of States. Id. at 77-81.
Professors McDougal and Reisman have asserted that any matter originating in one State with
deprivatory effects beyond its borders may be of international concern. Myers S. McDougal &
W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International
Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1968).
102. See generally GRoss, supra note 92. While claims of domestic jurisdiction have often
been defeated, article 2(7) has influenced how U.N. jurisdiction has been exercised. See id. 1173.
103. RUSSELL, supra note 81, at 900-03. It was after some debate that the exception in
article 2(7) was specifically confined to enforcement measures, which include nonmilitary
measures under article 41 and military measures under article 42. The travaux preparatoires
indicate that article 2(7) was to remain fully applicable to recommendations under both chapters
VI and VII. The express aim was to prohibit specific recommendations from the Security
Council, settling disputes arising from matters within the domestic jurisdiction of individual
States, even when the situation had so degenerated that there was an actual threat to, or breach
of, the peace. Preuss, supra note 78, at 587.
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concern." 4 They are: (1) major acts of international outrage during the
course of the conflict" 5 or significant violations of human rights; ° (2)
disputes of a considerable size, intensity, and length;'0 7 (3) the likelihood
of intervention by outside States assisting either the government in power,
the insurgents, or groups of countries assisting both sides;108 (4) actual or

104. Szasz, supra note 18, at 347-51. While any single factor might render a conflict
international, the greater the number of factors present in a given situation, the higher the
political pressure to find it a matter of international concern. Myers, supra note 4, at 74-75.
Professor Schachter has identified five categories of disputes which are of sufficient international
concern to warrant some degree of U.N. action: (1) internal conflicts involving charges of
external aggression or subversion; (2) conflicts characterized by a breakdown in law and order
with the resulting danger of external intervention; (3) anticolonial conflicts; (4) conflicts arising
from racism; and (5) internal strife involving massive suffering of noncombatants. Schachter,
U.N. & Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 409-10.

105. For instance, the Security Council found that the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South
Africa led to international friction which, if it continued, "might endanger international peace
and security." Myers, supra note 4, at 98 (quoting S.C. Res. 134, U.N. SCOR, 15th sess., 856th
mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/Rev.I (1960)); Rita F. Taubenfeld & Howard J.Taubenfeld,
Southern Africa in Brief, in RACE, PEACE, LAW, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 28 (John Carey ed.,

1968).
106. The General Assembly and the Security Council have passed numerous resolutions
on South Africa's racial policy of Apartheid. Goler T. Butcher, The Unique Nature of Sanctions
Against South Africa and Resulting Enforcement Issues, 19 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 821,

826-28 (1987). South Africa has consistently maintained that because of article 2(7), the
Organization does not have the right to even discuss the matter. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra
note 105, at 27. A series of chapter VI nonmandatory embargoes were imposed. Finally, in 1977,
the Security Council found that the policies and acts of the Republic of South Africa to protect
its Apartheid system, including violence against the indigenous black population, were fraught
with danger to international peace and security. Resolution 418 imposed a mandatory arms
embargo, under chapter VII. Butcher, supra at 829; Henry J.Richardson, III, Constitutive
Questions in the Negotiations for Namibian Independence, 78 AM. J.INT'L L. 76, 83 (1984).

The 1965 unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia, wherein the white
minority denied the black majority any participation in the political process, was found to be
a threat to international peace. S.C. Res. 232, supra note 43. While members referred to chapter
VII and interstate conflict, the international concern appeared to actually stem from gross
violations of human rights by the Smith regime. WHITE, supra note 37, at 42. There was also
the possibility that internal violence would spread and become international violence. White
believes the spill-over effect may be exaggerated in situations where there are significant
violations of human rights. Id. Human rights violations alone, however, even on a mass scale
have never been sufficient to provoke the Security Council to undertake armed intervention.
Myers, supra note 4, at 103. While the United States and its allies relied on Resolution 688
when it took military action against Iraq, it is highly questionable whether the Resolution
authorized such action. See infra part l.D.2.a. Somalia, however, may be an exception or the
basis for a new rule. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
107. Professor Szasz notes that small riots in a limited area and of limited duration could
not justify outside intervention. Major and continuous disorders, however, by their volume and
direction may be of international concern. He cites the disorders in Poland during the early
1980s as an example. Szasz, supra note 18, at 347. Other large-scale disorders remained
domestic because they did not invite outside intervention. Id.
108. See also William Chip, A United Nations Role in Ending Civil War, 19 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 15 (1981). Chip advocates a role for the United Nations when there is a
possibility of outside intervention. Cyprus is an example of an internal conflict likely to invite
outside intervention by other States because of its Greek and Turkish populations and historical
disputes between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and other issues. BOWETT, supra note 100,
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(5) classification as a

colonial conflict;" and (6) subjection of some parts of the dispute to
international agreement."' l

at 553; Myers, supra note 4, at 78. This outside intervention came to fruition in 1974 despite
the presence of the U.N. Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) since 1964. BLUE
HELMETS, supra note 3, at 215. The Congo dispute involved intervention by Belgium, and posed
the threat of intervention by the USSR and other States. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck & John
Carey, The Role of the United Nations in the Congo - A Retrospective Perspective, in THE
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AcTION IN THE CONGO (Lyman Tondel, Jr. ed.,
1963); Thomas Franck, United Nations Law in Africa: The Congo OperationAs A Case Study,
27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 632 (1962); E.M. Miller, Legal Aspects of the United Nation
Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1961). The U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon
(UNOGIL) was established in 1958 to ensure that there was no illegal influx of arms or
personnel amid charges of intervention by the United Arab Republic in the rebellion in Lebanon.
BLUE HELMETS, supra note 3, at 175. The United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
(UNYOM) was established in 1963 to monitor the terms of disengagement of Saudi Arabia and
Egypt from the civil war in Yemen. Id. at 187-90.
Of course, if unilateral intervention is requested by the government, that government will
argue that it is an internal matter for a State to decide whether to request assistance and as long
as no third States are unwillingly involved, the conflict is not internationalized. This is open
to discussion, and certainly does not preclude the situation from being a danger or threat to the
peace. If external assistance is received by the insurgents, the conflict is internationalized
because foreign assistance to insurgent groups puts the assisting government in conflict with
the government of the State concerned, thereby creating an inter-State conflict. Szasz, supra
note 18, at 348.
109. The most common spill-over is refugees, although cross-border military incursions
and incidents sometimes transpire. WHITE, supra note 37, at 110.
110. Internal rebellions and unrest in colonies were initially claimed by metropolitan powers
to be matters totally within their domestic jurisdiction because overseas territories were integral
parts of the metropolis. Over the years these questions were increasingly brought before the
world community, despite the objection of colonial sovereigns. With the adoption by the General
Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960) [hereinafter Declarationon the Granting of Independence], the domestic jurisdiction
argument became untenable. HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 100-05. Colonial rebellions are now
legally a matter of concern to the entire international community and their suppression a threat
to peace as a matter of international law. RAJAN, supra note 87; see also Schachter, U.N. &
InternalConflict, supranote 4. Some commentators have suggested that reimposing trusteeships
or some other form of colonialism is an appropriate method of dealing with the total breakdown
of civil order and society taking place in some States. See Claudio Segre, Colonialism May Be
Worth Brining Back, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 3, 1993, at A7; Gerald B. Helman & Steven R.
Ratner, Saving FailedStates, 89 FOREIGN POL'v 3. There are legal problems under the charter
with this solution, however. Helman & Ratner, supra at 16. While the self-determination issues
here may be of some relevance, the demise of colonialism makes this category of limited
usefulness for our purposes.
111. The dispute between India and South Africa over the treatment of Indians in South
Africa is an example. HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 83. In 1927 and 1932, South Africa and India
entered into agreements regarding the treatment of Indians in South Africa. In 1946, India argued that the passage of additional discriminatory legislation, which led to internal protests, was
an international dispute and a violation of U.N. Charter provisions barring racial discrimination.
South Africa argued that article 2(7) prevented the United Nations from even discussing the
issue. The General Assembly proceeded to adopt resolutions on the issue, through the 16th
session when it was merged with the issue of Apartheid. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note
105, at 27.
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The key elements have been self-determination, human rights abuses,
an impact upon neighboring States, or repercussions that present a
"danger" or "threat" to the peace. "Dangers" or "threats" to the peace have
usually resulted from intervention, or the potential for intervention, by
other States, since each of these factors, alone or in combination, can
eventually lead to international effects that trigger outside intervention.112
Furthermore, while the Organization has found internal conflicts to be of
international concern, they have not necessarily found them to be "threats"
to the peace. Consequently, chapter VII has 'not usually been invoked, and
the Organization has proceeded under chapter VI, which is recommendatory. Therefore, intervention has generally been at the request, or
with the consent, of the affected State.
2. Components That Have Remained Domestic
When it has intervened, the United Nations has, for the most part,
attempted to deal only with those aspects of the situation that made it
international; other issues have remained within the domestic jurisdiction
of the affected State. For example, in Lebanon and Yemen, the United
Nations established observer forces to monitor whether assistance was
coming from foreign States.' 3 In Cyprus, it kept the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities apart to prevent foreign intervention., 4 The United
Nations has been impartial and objective; it has not tried to influence or
decide the ultimate political solution. " 5 For example, in Lebanon, Yemen,
and Cyprus, it refused to take sides or dictate the outcome, adhering to
the general principle that the ultimate political solution is a domestic
matter for the people, not the United Nations, to decide. With respect to
severe human rights
violations based on race, 116 however, the Organization
17
has taken sides."

112. While there was little likelihood of outside States actually intervening in Southern
Rhodesia and South Africa, the ensuing protracted war against these regimes and the resulting
spill-over into other countries had acute international effects. Scheffer, supra note 29, at 286.
113. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 3, at 175, 187.
114. Id.

115. Id.; Schachter, U.N. & Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 414.
116. The human rights violations that the Organization has addressed most often are
Apartheid in South Africa and treatment of the black majority in Southern Rhodesia. Apartheid
has been found to be an international crime against humanity and thus is not considered an
internal matter. Butcher, supra note 106, at 822-23; International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 53, at 11, 15, U.N. Doc. A/9233/ADD.1 (1973).
117.. The Organization has taken sides in the case of severe human rights violations
involving racial discrimination and in the case of colonial conflicts. Racially discriminatory
policies have been strongly condemned, resolutions have demanded basic changes, and demands
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These principles raise acute difficulties when the Organization is
involved in an ongoing conflict, because in these circumstances, almost
any action favors one side or the other, as the U.N. peacekeeping mission
in the Congo (now Zaire) demonstrated." 8 In 1961, an ill-prepared Congo
was granted independence and soon thereafter, allegedly in response to
major internal disorders, Belgian forces intervened. The Congo requested
assistance to expel these forces. " 9 The Security Council immediately, and
in subsequent resolutions, called for withdrawal of all foreign forces' 20 and
the restoration of law and order, which was one of the factors that
precipitated Belgian intervention.' 2 ' Because these measures were directed
at eliminating external Belgian forces, they were largely uncontroversial.
Moreover, because the United Nations intervened at the request of the
Congo, its presence on Congolese territory was with the Congo's consent.
22
Thus, its presence did not raise article 2(7) concerns.

have been asserted as obligations on the basis of the U.N. Charter. Schachter, U.N. & Internal
Conflict, supra note 4, at 413.
118. The Congo is a classic case of internal strife that sparks intervention by foreign forces,
threatens further intervention by additional States, and possesses all of the earmarks of an
internal situation which could spark a major international conflagration. Not only had Belgian
troops intervened in response to the internal crisis, but additional unilateral intervention was
threatened. Miller, supra note 108, at 14; Franck, supra note 108, at 633. The U.N. role in this
particular conflict must not be taken out of context, however. The resolutions were often vague
and the Secretary General was given a great deal of discretion because of the lack of true
consensus on the Security Council. Moreover, these actions were taken in a true crisis
atmosphere. Miller, supra note 108 at 14-15.
119. The United States was approached first and refused, referring the government to the
United Nations. The central government then brought its case to the United Nations. On July
11, 1960, the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo requested urgent
military assistance from the United Nations. This request was based upon the presence of
Belgian troops contrary to the wishes of the government of the Congo, and thus in violation
of a treaty of friendship between the two countries. This unsolicited Belgian intervention was
viewed as an act of aggression by Congolese authorities. Franck & Carey, supra note 108, at
13.
120. The Security Council passed its first resolution in the crisis two days after the Congo's
request. This resolution gave the Secretary General the authority to provide the government of
the Congo with such military assistance as may be necessary. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 873d mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960). This led to the establishment of the Operationdes Nations Unies
au Congo (ONUC). This force remained in the Congo from July 1960 until June 1964. BLUE
HELMETS, supra note 3, at 215.
121. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 879th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4405 (1960), states that the complete
restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security. Because the Belgian intervention had
supposedly been due to the breakdown of internal law and order, it followed that the
maintenance of internal law and order was a necessary precondition to Belgian withdrawal and
thus to the successful accomplishment of the maintenance of international peace and security.
BOWETT, supra note 100, at 186-87.
122. Of course, if there is a threat to the peace and the Security Council is undertaking
enforcement or any action under chapter VII, consent is not required. See BOWETT, supra note
100, at 412-13. In the Congo, the United Nations at a number of points began to operate in a
manner contrary to the wishes of the Congolese government. Franck, supra note 108, at 638-43.
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What did provoke debate was the Organization's role in the ensuing
constitutional crisis and the attempted secession of the province of23
Katanga. Because the U.N. intervention was not an enforcement action,1
article 2(7) continued to apply,'24 and the Secretary General thus continually maintained that the Organization would not interfere in the dispute
between competing governmental factions, an entirely internal affair. Yet
a number of U.N. actions led to charges of assisting a particular side and
influencing the outcome of the constitutional crisis. 25 There were also
efforts by competing factions to use the United Nations to advance their
goals. 126 Eventually, the General Assembly and the Security Council
authorized the use of force to end the civil war, 27 and prevented the
secession of Katanga by military force.128 Many argued that this secession
was not an exercise in self-determination, however, but was inspired by
foreign forces.1 29 If nothing else, the U.N. experience in the Congo
demonstrates the almost impossible task of remaining neutral in an
ongoing war, despite the best of intentions. It also indicates that the

A number of commentators concluded that because this was also a chapter VII action, the United

Nations intervened as of right and controlled ONUC's operations and its demise. Id. at 642-43;
Miller, supra note 108, at 1; BowETT, supra note 100, at 421-22; cf. HIGGINS, supra note 85,
at 64 (noting that "Article 2(7) is an overriding provision, to which all Charter articles are
subject, save for express exceptions."). Yet in practice, until recently, the United Nations has
obtained the consent of the host State in peacekeeping operations, and it is unlikely it would
have intervened had the Congo not issued an invitation. Franck, supra note 108, at 643.
123. While the resolutions do not specify the articles of the Charter the Council relied on,
a number of commentators have persuasively advanced that the Council was probably
proceeding under article 40, which authorizes provisional measures to prevent the aggravation
of a situation. Miller, supra note 108, at 4-5; Franck, U.N. Law in Africa, supra note 108, at
644; HIGGINS, supra note 85, at 88-89, 235-37; BOWETT, supra note 100, at 288; Chip, supra
note 108, at 15. In an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice found that the operation did not involve preventive or enforcement measures against any State under chapter VII,
which suggests the Court did not consider articles 41 and 42 germane. Advisory Opinion,
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20).
124. The Secretary General consistently maintained that article 2(7) continued to apply.
Even when a later resolution invoked articles.25 and 49, it included an express statement that
the U.N. force in the Congo would not be a party to, or in any way intervene in, or be used
to influence the outcome of, any internal conflict, constitutional, or otherwise. U.N. SCOR, 15th
Sess., 886th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/4426 (1960). Again, a reference to domestic jurisdiction.
125. These charges were made most vociferously when the United Nations closed airfields
to all non-U.N. traffic and shut down a radio station in early September 1960. These measures
appeared to favor the forces acting against Lumumba. Franck & Carey, supra note 108, at
21-22.
126. See generally Miller, supra note 108, at 15-20; Franck, supra note 108, at 644-52.
127. U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 942d mtg. at 147, U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961) [hereinafter
S/4741]. The Security Council authorized the United Nations to use force'if necessary as a last
resort to prevent the occurrence of civil war and to bring about the halting of all military operations.
128. Franck & Carey, supra note 108, at 34-43.
129. Miller, supra note 108, at 17 (describing views expressed in the Security Council);
Franck, supra note. 108, at 632.
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mandate on this matter must be clear. Recent events indicate that the
United Nations is moving away from the principle of neutrality. Unfortunately, the end result may be to bog down the Organization in what are
sometimes intractable conflicts that it is not adept at resolving.130
D. Domestic Jurisdiction in Internal Conflicts: The Current
InternationalEnvironment
1. Broader International Jurisdiction
In the current international milieu, when the elements enumerated by
Szasz are applied, they are likely to make many more internal conflicts
of international concern. Outside support may result from ethnic or
religious affinities, as the case of the former Yugoslav Republics illustrates. 131 The actual or potential spill-over into other States can have
profound effects upon regional stability, given ethnic and religious bonds,
as the flight of Iraqi Kurds to neighboring countries with large restless
Kurdish populations indicates. 132 There is also less tolerance for human
rights abuses, which the situation in Somalia and the international response
133
to it illustrate.
With the collapse of the Cold War world order, which was characterized by superpower rivalry and a balance of power, there is a great deal
of uncertainty, and a larger degree of instability. The post-Cold War era
is characterized by the reemergence of buried nationalism and claims to
secede, rising political demands within countries and revolts against longtime dictators, protracted internal conflicts (some left-over from the Cold
War), and instability in numerous nascent democracies. These conditions
may increase the likelihood of a particular internal conflict having a
regional or international impact.
Consequently, based on the previous factors that internationalized
internal conflicts, current sensibilities and the contemporary international
130. An example is Somalia, which is discussed in detail infra part I.D.2.b.
131. Serbs from Serbia and Croats from Croatia have been assisting their Bosnian brethren
in carving out independent Serb and Croat republics in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The governments
of Croatia and Serbia, as well as the Croat and Serbian Bosnians, would like these independent
States to be affiliated with or part of Croatia and Serbia. Muslim nations have vowed to assist
Muslims in Bosnia. Claude van England, Islamic States' Concern for Bosnia, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1992, at 6; Hugh Pope, Turks Call for Weapons from Islamic Nations,
INDEPENDENT (London), June 12, 1993, at 8; Iran Offers Help to Bosnian Muslims, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 6, 1992, at 2; see also Cass, supra note 73, at 33-36, 38-39 (discussing

the growing number of claims to secede).
132. See infra part l.D.2.a.
133. See infra part I.D.2.b. Of course, the failure to respond to a similar crisis in Bosnia
makes this assertion somewhat tenuous.
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environment would indicate a role for the United Nations in a greater
number of internal conflicts. This is borne out in practice as the Organiation undertakes to resolve and assist in many contemporary internal
conflicts. 34
'
Furthermore, the Security Council is carving out new grounds for
international concern and jurisdiction. Failure to allow the delivery of
humanitarian assistance has become an international matter that permits
intervention without State consent.135 Some contemporary conflicts may
attract no outside assistance for either side; the country may disintegrate
as in Somalia. 3 6 In these cases, it is more likely, although not certain, that
profound humanitarian or human rights abuses may result. Therefore, the
Council has asserted jurisdiction. This decision shifts additional internal
conflicts into the international sphere because the resulting humanitarian
crises, in and of themselves, with no threat of unilateral intervention,
appear to have given the Council mandatory jurisdiction. 137 It also
indicates that international concern in internal conflicts can arise from
human rights violations that do not involve racial discrimination or
colonialism. 138
The case of Haiti raises questions about the proper role of the
Organization in these matters because the Security Council decided which
faction was the appropriate government and mandated settlement by
demanding that a deposed leader be restored to power. 139 This is unprecedented because these issues have long been considered an internal question
in previous internal conflicts, except with respect to the case of Apartheid
in South Africa which has been declared a crime against humanity, a

134. This is not to discount the impact of recent and profound political changes that include
the end of the Cold War and a Security Council that is working together. Still, most of these
conflicts have been brought to the Organization by affected or surrounding States. This indicates
that domestic jurisdiction limitations are receding as long as there is consent.
135. Somalia and Iraq are examples. See infra parts I.D.2.a,b.
136. There has been an outflow of refugees, however. Paul Lewis, U.N. Will Increase
Troops in Somali, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1993, at A3; Lucia Mouat, U.N. to Break New Ground
in Plan for Peacekeepers in Somali, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 16, 1993, at 2; Out With
Them, EcONOMIST, Feb. 6, 1993, at 46. Somalia also presents the prospect of the total collapse

of governmental authority.
137. This jurisdiction has been based upon a finding of a threat to the peace, which has
broad implications regarding the power of the Security Council. See infra notes 299-304 and
accompanying text.
138. Colonial questions had racial undertones, given that most colonies were in Africa and
Asia, and the metropolitan powers were European. The main element here, however, was selfdetermination. See Declarationon Granting Independence, supra note 110. The situations in

South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, partly because of the racial element, did precipitate
involvement by surrounding States who let opposing forces operate on their territories, thus
drawing them into the conflict.
139. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 27, 16, at 4.
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violation of international law, and a threat to the peace. 14 In the case of
Haiti, while there were human14 1rights abuses, they were not the central

focus of the U.N. Resolution.

2. Contemporary Interventions: Case Studies
U.N. interventions in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, are situations that
warrant special attention because they raise questions regarding the
evolution of the concept of domestic jurisdiction. 142 In Iraq, the Security
Council intervened in an internal conflict without the consent of the
affected State despite the conspicuous absence of chapter VII. 143 In
Somalia, the Council intervened without the State's consent, and has
effectively eliminated one party from the political process. In Haiti, it has
determined which government should be in power, heretofore a distinctly
domestic concern. Thus, in both Somalia and Haiti, the Organization has
on some level taken sides in the conflict. These situations are all complicated by findings of "threats" to the peace. Yet Somalia and Haiti raise
profound questions regarding the parameters of this term, making later
actions by the Security Council more problematic.
a. Iraq
Security Council Resolution 688, which deals with Iraq's suppression
of the rebellion by Iraqi Kurds in the aftermath of the Gulf conflict, is

140. Butcher, supra note 106, at 821-24.
141. Human rights abuses were the focus of a series of General Assembly resolutions and
reports by the Secretary General. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/7 (1991); Human Rights Questions: Situation of Human Rights in Haiti: Note by the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(c), U.N. Doc. A/47/621 (1992);
The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess.,' Agenda Item 22, U.N. Doc. A/47/908 (1992). A number of resolutions
condemned the coup and stated the desire of the international community for a restoration of
democracy. But human rights abuses have long been matters in the international sphere. See
generally Scheffer, supra note 29. The U.N. role in the election of the democratic government,
which was the subject of some debate, also may afford the Organization a special role in this
particular internal matter. There is also the matter of the request by the Haitian representative
to consider the matter. But if this representative does not embody the de facto government, it
would seem this consent is doubtful. Nonetheless, international concern is different from
mandating a solution.
142. While this article and this symposium issue focuses on North Africa and the Middle
East, Haiti and Yugoslavia are also included in the analysis because they round-out the analysis
of recent Security Council measures that touch upon the concept of domestic jurisdiction, and
the actions which are permissible under the Charter in these situations.
143. The Council did, however, find a threat to the peace. While there are many previous
examples of the Council proceeding under chapter VII without citing it, this is difficult to assert
here given the Council's new found willingness to cite and rely on this chapter. This has
especially been the case with Iraq. See, e.g., IRAQ AND KUWAIT: THE HOSTILITIES AND THEIR
AFTERMATH 2-6 (Marc Weller ed., 1993) (reprinting Security Council Resolutions 660, 661,
664, 666, 667, 670, 678).
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instructive, as is the debate which preceded its passage. There were a
number of potential reasons for U.N. intervention in the resulting situation,
including: (1) a massive refugee crisis that resulted after Iraq quelled the
Kurdish rebellion; (2) the refugees' ethnic identity - which could have
caused severe problems for the countries they were fleeing to; (3) severe
human rights violations by Iraq; and (4) the fact that the region had just
experienced a major conflagration. Despite all these factors, all members
of the Security Council raised article 2(7) concerns and several States
asserted that it precluded Council action. The Resolution barely passed,
receiving only ten votes. Clearly, in the absence of consent to intervention,
domestic jurisdiction remains a viable concept to Member States when
internal revolts are the subject matter. A close analysis of the situation is
therefore warranted.
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War,"4 Kurdish guerrillas in
Northern Iraq moved against Iraqi forces, 145 in an attempt to gain independence from Iraq for the Kurdish minority. 46 Iraqi military forces
moved to quell the revolt and were successful. 14 7 The fierce military
onslaught by government forces prompted large numbers of Kurds to
attempt to flee Iraq for Turkey and Iran. 148 Scenes of "wretched starving"
Kurds dying of exposure 14 9 led to worldwide anger and pressure for
Security Council action.'50 Council Members began seeking some means
of aiding the Kurds without directly intervening in the crisis.' Direct

144. The Persian Gulf War began with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The
Security Council responded immediately with Resolution 660 which demanded the immediate
and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
145. President Bush repeatedly called for the removal of President Hussein and encouraged
a revolt against him. Tom Wicker, In the Nation; War's Real Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1991, at A21. A Shiite insurrection against the regime of Saddam Hussein also erupted in the
Southern part of Iraq. Clifford Krauss, U.S. Urges Turkey to Open Borders to Fleeing Kurds,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at Al, A8; Richard W. Murphy, How to Support Saddam's
Opposition, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 31, 1992, at 19.
146. The Kurds are a Turkic ethnic group without a State who have long fought for some
measure of autonomy. They are spread between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Soviet Union.
Chris Hedges, Kurds' Dream of FreedomSlipping Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,1992, at Al, AI0;
Tony Caplan, Britain Mounts Emergency Relief Aid for Fleeing Kurds, UPI, Apr. 4, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Dennis Hevesi, Two Rights Groups Indict Iraqis
for Attacks on Kurds in 80's, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1992, at A6.
147. Hevesi, supra note 146.
148. Leonard Doyle, Crisis in the Gulf.: Allies Seek New Resolution to Give Humanitarian
Aid, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 5, 1991, at 10.
149. Peter Jenkins, The New World is Not This Way, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 9,1991,
at 7; Caplan, supra note 146.
150. Doyle, supra note 148.
151. Resolutions were discussed that would condemn the manner in which the uprising
was crushed and humanitarian aid was pledged by the United Kingdom. Caplan, supra note 146.
The United States called on Turkey to open its borders. Krauss, supra note 145, at Al, A8.
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intervention was ostensibly ruled out because the U.N. Charter forbids
intervention in the domestic affairs of Member States. 152 Others, however,
urged intervention, relying on the Genocide Convention 153 which defines
the repression of any ethnic or cultural grouping as a crime under interna154
tional law.
The debate continued as the Security Council considered Resolution
688 which demanded that Iraq cease its repression of the Kurdish minority. 55 Every State referred to article 2(7) and the domestic jurisdiction
or internal affairs of Iraq (as does the Resolution itself). Clearly this issue
was of paramount importance to Member States, as was the awareness that
an important precedent was being set. Most Council members considered
Iraq's treatment of its Kurdish population an internal matter that had to
be removed from Iraq's internal jurisdiction. What ultimately brought it
into the international sphere was its impact on neighboring States.
Although the human rights abuses were roundly deplored, they seemed
to be insufficient in and of themselves to make it an international
matter
56
in the eyes of most members of the Security Council. 1
The two States most directly affected, Turkey and Iran, referred to the
immense number of refugees crossing their borders and viewed this influx,
and the potential inflow, as a threat to the security of neighboring
countries and as potentially destabilizing inter-State relations in the
region.' 57 As a result, the massive movement of people took the matter out
of Iraq's internal affairs 158 and made the Security Council action, including
forceful action to secure an immediate cessation of the repression of the
inhabitants in the area, proper. 5 9 Although there was massive suffering
taking place in Iraq, U.N. jurisdiction to alleviate that suffering appeared
to be based upon the international implications of massive refugee flows.

152. Caplan, supra note 146; Germany Urges International Effort for Kurds, UPI, Apr.
5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. No doubt States also hesitated because
of fears of getting involved in a quagmire.
153. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

154. The Genocide Convention does not apply to political genocide. See id. Iraq was
arguably trying to eliminate a political force and therefore this argument may not have been
entirely sound.
155. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982 (1991).

156. Id.
157. Turkey estimated over 100,000 refugees had entered Turkey, with 600,000 moving

towards its borders. Id. at 6-7. Iran estimated that more than 110,000 Iraqi civilians had crossed
the border into Iran and up to one-half million might potentially do so. Id. at 12-13.
158. Id. at 7 (Turkey), 13-15 (Iran). Both countries mentioned respect for the territorial
independence and sovereignty of Iraq, with Turkey citing article 2(7).

159. See id. at 7 (Turkey). Iran simply called for immediate measures. Id. at 13-15.
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Several other countries supported this reasoning,' 6° while another
group of countries found no "threat to the peace," leaving the matter
within the internal jurisdiction of Iraq under article 2(7).16, According to
the latter group, any requisite humanitarian assistance should be rendered
through other U.N. agencies.162 Several Western nations, however, placed
human rights abuses closer to the center of the situation. 163
Given the impact this rebellion was having on the region, the Member
States' hesitancy to intervene indicates that they continue to view internal
rebellions as largely internal matters in the absence of consent. Even
human rights deprivations were not enough to make this an international
issue warranting intervention. Rather, it was the massive flow of refugees
resulting from those violations that were germane.
Nonetheless, the ultimate passage of Resolution 688 involved the
Security Council in a civil conflict without the consent of the State
involved. Because consent has been the basis for jurisdiction in the
absence of chapter VII enforcement measures, this is a new and important
development.164 It moves such findings past situations involving racial discrimination (Apartheid) or colonialism by demanding that repression of
a rebellion halt, and by finding that such repression may be a "threat" to
the peace. The Resolution hopes for an open dialogue to ensure that the
human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected. While this
expresses an opinion as to the settlement of the internal power struggle,
it is clearly only a "hope" rather than an actual disposition of the situation,
which remains an internal matter.
Significantly, the Council also insisted on access by humanitarian
agencies to all parts of Iraq, and that Iraq make available all necessary

160. Council members that made statements to this effect included, id. at 22 (Romania),
36 (Ecuador), 37 (Zaire), 41 (Cote d'Ivoire), 56 (Austria), 57-58 (United States), 61 (USSR),
69 (Italy). Other States included, Luxembourg, id. at 74-75 (Luxemberg), 78 (Denmark), 79-80
(Ireland), 82-83 (Sweden).
161. See id. at 31 (Zimbabwe), 27 (Yemen), 43 (Cuba), 56 (China) (should address those
aspects which are international; this resolution goes beyond that and addresses internal matters).
162. Id. at 46-52 (Cuba).
163. Id. at 53 (France: "Violations of human rights such as those now being observed,
become a matter of international interest when they take on such proportions that they assume
the dimensions of a crime against humanity."); Human rights are not essentially domestic. Id.
at 64-66 (U.K.). Other States expressing similar sentiments that were not members of the
Council included Germany, id. at 71-73, Spain, id. at 81, and the Netherlands, id. at 86.
164. The Resolution found that repression of the rebellion was a threat to the peace, but
did not make its decisions mandatory under chapter VII. The Resolution demanded that Iraq
cease this repression as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security.
While this Resolution was used to justify a no-fly zone over portions of Iraq, this reliance is
doubtful.
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facilities for their operation. 165 The need to render humanitarian assistance
has made internal conflicts of international concern in the past. 166 Yet such
access has always been with the approval and cooperation of the affected
State; it had never been insisted upon. More importantly, this provision
may have laid the foundation for the more far-reaching findings in
Somalia. 167
Eventually, in May 1991, the Secretary General executed a memorandum of understanding with Iraq that governed the supply and distribution of humanitarian assistance. Consequently, the territorial sovereignty
of Iraq was not violated in this instance.' 68 The perceived need to obtain
such an agreement may have been partly due to practical concerns' 69 and
partly due to concern over the infringement of Iraqi sovereignty.
b. Somalia
Somalia presents a case of intervention where there was no governmental authority, whether constitutional or insurgent, to consent. It also
raises questions regarding humanitarian assistance as an international
matter, and the U.N. role in deciding a political settlement.
Since Major General Mohammed Siad Barre170 fled Mogadishu in
January 1991, culminating a ten year civil war, 171 there has been no

165. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 28. This finding is also significant because the situation
was deemed to be a threat to the peace thereby laying the groundwork for a chapter VII finding,
and the use of force if a State refuses to permit humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, it
is significant that chapter VII is not relied upon here, despite its omnipresence in previous

resolutions dealing with Iraq.
166. Schachter, U.N. & Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 401.
167. See infra notes 178-95, 293-95 and accompanying text.
168. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/22663 (1991).
169. It is very difficult to deliver such assistance without the cooperation of the territorial
sovereign.
170. President Shermaarke was killed by one of his bodyguards, and thus in October 1969,
Major General Mohammad Siad Barre led the army to power. The newly-installed Supreme
Revolutionary Council (SRC), named Siad Barre President and indicated that it was pursing
scientific socialism, which facilitated continued Soviet assistance.
171. To entrench his personal rule and to regain the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, Siad Barre
launched the Ogaden War in 1977. It officially ended in 1978, although skirmishes and border
raids continued for years afterwards. The war was a disaster for Somalia resulting in the loss
of 8,000 men, an influx of about 650,000 ethnic Somali and Ethiopian Oromo refugees, and
a severe drain on the economy. During the war, the USSR shifted its support to Ethiopia
prompting Siad Barre to turn to the United States. In 1980, the United States obliged, agreeing
to provide arms and military training, in return for military access to Somali ports and airfields
in the event of a crisis. The armed forces had expanded from 5,000 troops at independence to
65,000 in 1980, and 30% of the national budget was devoted to the military.
The Ogaden War led to the rise of several organized internal opposition movements. To
counter them, Siad Barre undertook increasingly repressive measures, many involving severe
human rights violations. Upon judging a number of Majeerteen clan members of the military
guilty of a coup attempt in 1978, Siad Barre initiated a campaign against the clan-family. Several
Majeerteen colonels escaped and fled abroad where, in 1978, they formed the Somali Salvation
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functioning government in Somalia.'72 Various clan militias turned on one
another, dividing the country into twelve zones of control, while the
United Somali Congress split into two competing factions and became
engaged in a full-scale civil war.7 3 In the meantime, part of the North
declared independence. '74 This state of anarchy, and the collapse of most
civil institutions, made it nearly impossible to deliver food and medical
supplies and other forms 75of humanitarian assistance, resulting in massive
starvation and suffering.
The Security Council's role in Somalia began with a request from the
Somali representative to the United Nations 176 and from several organizations to consider the situation, as well as a report from the Secretary
General. 7 Thus, jurisdiction was initially premised upon the request and
the consent of Somalia. Of course, whether this consent was effective is

Front, renamed in 1979, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front. This was the first opposition
movement dedicated to overthrowing the regime by force. Siad Barre then turned on the lsaaq
clan-family in the North, who were discontented because they felt inadequately represented in
the Government. Isaaq dissidents in London had formed the Somali National Movement (SNM)
in 1981 to topple the regime. In 1982, the SNM transferred its headquarters to Ethiopia, from
which it conducted guerrilla raids against Somali territory which were met with bloody reprisals.
Siad Barre then attacked the Hawiye clan-family in the central area around Mogadishu. The
Hawiye had formed their own opposition movement, the United Somali Congress (USC), which
received support from the SNM. The Ogaden clan had originally given Siad Barre strong
support, but subsequently blamed him for Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden war; they also opposed
his 1988 peace treaty and his resumption of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. As a result many
Ogaden army officers deserted and joined the Somali Patriotic Movement, an opposition group
formed in 1985 and a recipient of SNM support.
Siad Barre thus progressively alienated an increasing number of clans and various
opposition groups waged relatively intense warfare against the national army during his final
three years in office. They gained control of extensive areas: the SNM in the Northwest, the
United Somali Congress in the Center, and the Somali Patriotic Movement in the South. Fifty
thousand unarmed civilians were killed in the course of Siad Barre's various reprisals against
the Majeerteen, Isaaq, and Hawiye. Thousands more died of starvation due to well poisonings
and cattle slaughters. Hundreds of thousands sought refuge outside the country.
Following a July 1989 demonstration in Mogadishu in which almost 450 persons were
killed by government forces, leaders of various sectors of society, representing all clan-families,
formed the Council for National Reconstruction and Salvation to press for political change.
While the opposition groups recognized the need to hold talks amongst themselves to coordinate
strategy; time did not allow mutual trust to develop. Opposition forces defeated Siad Barre's
regime on January 27, 1991. After a stay in Kenya, he ultimately sought refuge in Nigeria. Said
S. Samatar, Historical Setting, in SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 3 (Helen Chapin Metz ed.,
1993).
172. Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 109, 112.
173. One faction was headed by General Mohammed Farah Aidid, the other by Ali Mahdi
Mohammed, a wealthy Mogadishu businessman.
174. In May 1991, the SNM proclaimed the Republic of Somaliland as an interim
government, pending 1993 elections. As of 1993, it had not been recognized by any foreign
government. See SOMALIA: A COUNTY STUDY, supra note 171, at xxx.
175. Seth Faison, U.N. Head Proposes Expanded Efforts for Somali Relief, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1992, at Al, A8; Time to Interfere, FIN. TIMES (London), July 29, 1992, at 16.
176. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23445 (1992).
177. The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
U.N. Docs. S/23693 and S/23693/Corr. 1 (1992).
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questionable, given the breakdown in civil authority in Somalia and
questions as to whether there was any government at all to give consent.
The Council responded by urging a cessation of hostilities, calling for
coordination and cooperation in developing humanitarian assistance, and
imposing an arms embargo under chapter VII. 78 What made this conflict
international is unclear, but several Council members noted the request
by Somalia,'7 9 the refugee crisis precipitated by the civil war, and the
humanitarian crisis itself.' 80 In subsequent resolutions, the Council took
additional actions, including the deployment of observers and technical
teams, the establishment of a U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), an
authorization to deploy security personnel, and finally, the institution of
an emergency airlift. 18'In August 1992, the number of U.N. personnel was
18 2
substantially increased.
These measures, however, did not resolve the problem. Food and other
supplies were regularly looted and aid agencies had to pay protection
money in order to get supplies through.'83 The United States indicated that
it was willing to deploy a substantial military force to facilitate the
delivery of humanitarian supplies. 184 The Secretary General issued a report

178. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992).
The arms embargo was for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Somalia.
179. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3060th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3060 (1992).
180. Id.
181. S.C. Res. 746, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3060th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/746 (1992),
relied upon the request of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/23693, supra note 177, to dispatch
a technical team to Somalia which would establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded
delivery of humanitarian assistance. The warring factions were also urged to abide by the ceasefire agreements. Id. IN 73, 74. Resolution 751 established a U.N. Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM), authorized immediate deployment of 50 observers to monitor the cease fire in the
capital, and established a security force to facilitate the distribution of food and other
humanitarian assistance. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/751 (1992). Problems later developed in reaching agreement with the warring factions
on deployment of this force. See Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia,

U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24343 (1992). Resolution 767 (July 27, 1992) authorized
an emergency airlift to deliver humanitarian assistance and called for cooperation in the
deployment of the security personnel called for in Resolution 751. S.C. Res. 767, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3101st mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/767 (1992). The Council delivered a warning
that it did not exclude other measures if cooperation was not forthcoming. It is not clear that
consent was obtained for the airlift.
182. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 31 10th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (1992)
authorized the deployment of an additional 4,200 personnel. This action was based upon the
recommendation of the Secretary General, The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary

General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 7, U.N. Docs. S/24480 and S/24480/Add. 1 (1992), who
proposed deployment of additional forces in four zones. Previously forces had been limited to
Mogadishu.
183. Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/24868 (1992)
[hereinafter Letter Dated 29 November].
184. Letter Dated 17 December 1992 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th
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laying out five options, one of which included a country-wide enforcement
action by a group of Member States acting with authorization from the
Security Council. 8 5 Based on this report, the Council adopted Resolution
794 on December 3, 1992, authorizing Member States to use force in
order to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance; the Unified Task
Force (UNITAF) was created to carry out this task."8 6
The Secretary General recommended, and the Council found, that
there was a "threat" to the peace.' 87 Thus, international jurisdiction no
longer needed to be premised on consent. While the Council clearly no
longer considered the situation essentially domestic, it failed to indicate
what made the situation international. Member States referred to the
situation as imperiling the stability of the region' 88 and declared that the
situation had simply reached a point where it constituted a "threat" to
international peace and security. 8 9 It was emphasized that Somalia
presented an exceptional and unique situation, that it was sui generis.'90
This is accurate, given the almost total breakdown of governmental

Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/24976 (1992).
185. The Secretary General outlined five options directed towards creating conditions for
the uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia: (1) to deploy
UNOSOM in accordance with Resolution 775 and continue to operate according to traditional
peace-keeping principles; (2) withdraw the military elements of UNOSOM; (3) have UNOSOM
undertake a show of force in Mogadishu; (4) an enforcement action under the command of
Member States; and (5) a country-wide enforcement action undertaken under U.N. command.
See Letter Dated 29 November, supra note 183, at 2-6. The Secretary General concluded that
option one was inadequate, that option two would admit defeat, that UNOSOM forces were
insufficiently armed to carry out option three, and that the United Nations was not quite ready
to undertake his preferred alternative, option five. Id. Option four was adopted.
186. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 26, at 3. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was established
and commanded by the United States. Approximately 37,000 troops were eventually deployed
in Southern and Central Somalia. Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in
Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 2,
6, U.N. Doc. S/25354 (1993) [hereinafter Report of Secretary-General S125354].

187. See generally infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
188. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 19-20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3145 (1992)
[hereinafter S/PV.3145].
189. Id. For this conclusion, the Council relied upon the Secretary General's report, Letter
Dated 29 November, supra note 183, at 3. In this report, the Secretary General stated:
[alt present no government exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use
of force. It would therefore be necessary for the Security Council to make a
determination under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a
result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region, and to decide
what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and security. The
Council would also have to determine that non-military measures as referred to in
Chapter VII were not capable of giving effect to the Council's decisions.
Id. This statement does not explain what regional repercussions caused the situation to be a
threat to the peace.
190. S/PV.3145, supra note 188, at 7 (Zimbabwe), 12 (Ecuador), 17 (China).
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authority.' 9' Nonetheless, it may also indicate that Member States did not
want this action to be interpreted as precedent for future situations. 92 The
Resolution, and most
States, also underscored the humani-tarian nature of
93
these measures. 1

Unless refugees alone made the situation a "threat" to the peace, it
must have been the humanitarian aspects which made this situation of
international concern, because no other impact on the region was specified
in the Secretary General's report, upon which the Resolution was based,
nor in the debates, nor in the Resolution itself. Indeed, Austria noted that
the Council was building on the precedent established in Resolution 688,
which addressed the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. 94 A number of other
Western States expressed the view that this was a collective humanitarian
intervention. As for non-Western States, the concerns appeared to be more
related to U.N., versus U.S., control over the operation, rather than
whether this was an internal matter. 95 These States also cited the grave
humanitarian situation and the humanitarian objectives behind the use of
force. Thus, with this Resolution, a humanitarian crisis with no discernible
cross-border effects, or at least none that involved military responses,
triggered the most extreme measures the Council can undertake. This
portends a truly revolutionary evolution in the role of the United Nations
in internal conflicts.
With UNOSOM II, the Security Council decided to enter the nationbuilding, or perhaps rebuilding, business - a business, which the events
of early June 1993 indicate, can become dirty and difficult. Resolution
814196 established UNOSOM II, a chapter VII military action under U.N.
command. 97 UNOSOM II was given a broad mandate which included the
authority to take appropriate action against any faction that violated or
threatened to violate the cessation of hostilities and to carry out such

191. Id. at 16 (China).
192. Resolution 794 recognized the unique character of the present situation in Somalia
and is mindful of its deteriorating, complex, and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate
and exceptional response. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 26, at 1; S/PV.3145, supra note 188, at
16 (China), 7 (Zimbabwe).
193. The Resolution noted with grave alarm the deteriorating humanitarian situation and
the underlying urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance. S.C. Res. 794,
supra note 26, at 1.
194. See S/PV.3145, supra note 188, at 31.
195.

See id. passim.

196. S.C. Res. 814, supra note 26, at

1-6.

197. The Security Council determined that the situation in Somalia continued to threaten
the peace. Previous chapter VII enforcement operations gave Member States the authority to
use force and were therefore carried out by individual States.
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functions as the Security Council authorized. 98 While UNOSOM II could
use force, the Secretary General and Resolution 814 maintained that the
United Nations would not be a substitute for the will of the people.' 99 This
indicated that even with a "threat" to the peace necessitating enforcement,
such principles as self-determination and political independence remain.
Accordingly, the United Nations would not impose a particular system of
government, although the Secretary General maintained that it should be
in a position to press for observance of U.N. standards of human rights
and justice.2
On June 5th, 1993, a Pakistani contingent of UNOSOM II was
attacked, killing over twenty soldiers, wounding over fifty, and leaving
ten missing. One of the Somali factional leaders, General Aidid, was
believed to be responsible. 20 ' Council members were outraged20 2 and
passed Resolution 837 in response.2 3 This Resolution reaffirmed that the
Secretary General was authorized under Resolution 814 to take all
necessary measures against those responsible, including investigation,

198. The mandate also included maintaining control of heavy weapons and seizing all small
arms; securing and maintaining security at all ports; protecting the personnel, installations, and
equipment of the United Nations pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which
could assume this responsibility; continuing mine clearance; and assisting in the repatriation of
refugees and displaced persons. Report of the Secretary General S/25354, supra note 186, at
12-13. UNOSOM was also expanded in terms of personnel. 20,000 military personnel, 8,000
logistical support staff, and a 2,800 person civilian support staff were authorized. S.C. Res. 814,
supra note 26, at 4. The United States also agreed to supply a tactical quick reaction force which
would be available in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II. Report of SecretaryGeneral S125354, supra note 186, at 17.
199. Report of Secretary-GeneralS/25354, supra note 186, at 20 ("security, reconciliation
and peace must spring from the Somalis themselves."); S.C. Res. 814, supra note 26, at 1.
200. Report of Secretary General S/25354, supra note 186, at 20. There is precedent for
imposition of a human rights standard. Reports of tribal .warfare and the slaughter of civilians
in the Congo led to action by ONUC. The Secretary General viewed this as more than internal
political conflict. Rather, it was a flagrant violation of elementary human rights and had
characteristics of the crime of genocide. The Secretary General believed the United Nations
could and should take action. See Miller, supra note 108, at 18. Here, it appears that the United
Nations should press for U.N. standards of human rights and justice in the context of a political
settlement and the choice of governmental organization. This is a substantial step, especially
because it is within the context of an enforcement action. Moreover, the mandate of UNOSOM
covered the entire country, including the North, which had issued a secession proclamation. The
Secretary General maintained that extending the mandate to cover the North "would not
prejudice in any way the decision of the Somali people on their national future." Report of
Secretary-General S/25354, supra note 186, at 21.
201. Paul Lewis, U.N. Asks Arrests of Somalia Killers, N.Y. TiMES, June 7, 1993, at A3;
Michael Littlejohns, U.N. Acts After Somalia Killings: Callfor Arrest of Warlord After Ambush
of Pakistani Troops, FIN. TIMES (London), June 7, 1993, at 14.
202. Littlejohns, supra note 201, at 14; Robin Wright & Josh Friedman, U.N. Calls for
Crackdown After Killings in Somalia, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1993, at Al.
203. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837
(1993).
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arrest, detention, and prosecution. What followed were attacks upon
Aidid's headquarters and other facilities. 2" A number of civilians were
killed in the process and segments of the Somali population turned against
the United Nations.2 5 A massive manhunt was undertaken to find and
prosecute Aidid. 2°
If the objective was to eliminate Aidid as a political force, this may
indicate that the United Nations was markedly influencing the eventual
political settlement. 2 7 This is complicated by the finding that the situation
in Somalia is a "threat" to the peace, an issue to which this article we will
return. 08 Given the broad powers accruing to the Council when it undertakes enforcement, and the exception in article 2(7) for enforcement
measures, displacing an internal political force may be permissible if a
safe and secure environment is necessary to restore peace and security.
If Aidid's actions critically and negatively impact upon this objective, the
Security Council may pursue a course of action that would eliminate him
from the process. Still, this course of events is problematic because the
United Nations was supplanting the people of Somalia in determining a
settlement, in a situation where there appeared to be little, if any, outside
interference. This differed from the situation in the Congo, where some
charged that preventing the secession of Katanga usurped the exercise of
self-determination by the Congolese people. In the Congo, there was
credible evidence that the attempted secession was instigated and abetted
by foreign forces. 209 This is clearly not the case in Somalia, where all

204. Donatella Lorch, U.N. Says Attack Dealt Heavy Blow to Somali Faction, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1993, at Al; Keith B. Richburg, U.S. Planes Launch U.N. Attack on Somali Warlord,
WASH. POST, June 12, 1993, at Al; Keith B. Richburg, U.S. Planes Hit Mogadishu Again,
WASH. POST, June 13, 1993, at A].
205. Leslie Crawford, Somalis Cast U.N. Peacekeepers in Role of Tyrants, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 15, 1993, at 1; Donatella Lorch, American Jets Fly Over Somali Capital,
Provoking Jeers and Insults, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1993, at AI0; Keith B. Richburg, Somali
Mob Kills Three Journalists; Melee Follows Raid on Militia Forces, WASH. POST, July 13, 1993,
at Al.
206. Donatella Lorch, Aidid's Forces Still Strong, U.N. Aides in Somalia Say, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1993, at A6; U.S. Admits Missile Error in Somalia, GAZETTE (Montreal), June 16 1993,
at A16.
207. Part of the U.N. mission has been to assist the Somali people in their efforts towards
national reconciliation. The Secretary General's efforts in this regard are summarized in his
Progress Report on the Situation in Somalia. The Situation in Somalia; Progress Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 1-3, H 3-15 U.N. Doc. S/25168 (1993). Yet it
has been continually acknowledged that reconciliation is ultimately in the hands of the Somali
people. Id. at 3, 1 14.
208. See infra part I1.B. It is also complicated by the difficulties entailed in enforcement,
which negates consent, and in attempting to bring about a political settlement in the midst of
ongoing hostilities. Inevitably hostilities will also be directed towards the United Nations itself.
Truly, the United Nations is in a no-win situation.
209. Miller, supra note 108, at 2-3.
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factions and forces were Somali and one faction, with a significant
following, is being eliminated from the political process.210 If a particular
leader genuinely constitutes a "threat" to the peace, disposing of such a
leader may be permissible, and that may have been the case here. But the
burden of showing a "threat" to the peace should be high and the "threat"
should be evident.I That test was not met here.2t2
c. Haiti
The situation in Haiti takes this complex problem another step further,
for here the Organization mandated which of the competing factions was
to be in power. The U.N. role in Haiti began with the supervision of
Haiti's first free elections,213 wherein Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected
President by an overwhelming majority.21 4 Unfortunately, Aristide was
deposed in a military-led coup less than a year later.2t3 The General
Assembly responded by strongly condemning the coup, and demanding
immediate restoration of the legitimate elected government, full application
of the Constitution, and full observance of human rights.21 6 On October
3, 1991, the Security Council heard an impassioned plea from Aristide and
discussed the matter, but took no action.217

210. The highly negative public reaction in Somalia to U.N. activities indicates that General
Aidid does have internal support.
211. Moreover, all of the issues addressed in part IV must be carefully thought through
or such actions may begin to look like unilateral intervention in some cases. This is especially
so if the military forces are from a dominant military power and there are suspicions that the
Council is really a front for the interests of one State.
212. See infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
213. G.A. Res. 45/2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/45/2 (1990). This assistance
was requested by the lawful authorities of Haiti and assistance was rendered in cooperation with
the Organization of American States (OAS). There was some debate as to whether the United
Nations should be engaged in election monitoring, which was viewed by some as an internal
matter. Yet the request and consent of the lawful authorities of Haiti were determinative in
overcoming these objections. U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 26th mtg. at 61-64, U.N. Doc.
A/45/PV.26 (1990). Several nations also noted the international aspects including refugees and
potential dangers to peace and security. See id. at 22 (Dominican Republic), 52 (Bahamas), 62
(Bolivia); see also U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 29th mtg. at 57-58, U.N. Doc. A/45/PV.29
(1990)(Cuba).
214. President Aristide, who received almost 68% of the vote, has long enjoyed a large
measure of popular support in Haiti. See generally AMY WILENTZ, THE RAINY SEASON: HAITI
SINCE DuVALIER LEFr (1989).
215. Haiti's Military Assumes Power After Troops Arrest the President,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1991, at AI; Howard W. French, Army Strikes Back: Aristide Tried to Put HaitianMilitary
Under Control at Last, So It Rebelled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at A12; David Adams, Troops
Hold Sway in Wrecked Haiti Capital, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 4, 1991, at 11.

216. The Resolution also asked the Secretary General to consider providing support to the
Secretary General of the OAS in implementing several OAS Resolutions that froze Haitian assets
and imposed a trade embargo. G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 141.
217. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 301 Ith mtg. at 53-54, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3011(1991); Anthony
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The General Assembly returned to the situation, passing several
resolutions on human rights and democracy in Haiti. 2' 8 Few States
officially professed that this was an internal dispute that should not be
before the Assembly, although there are indications that it was a concern
to some. 219 Nevertheless, concrete actions were centered upon the Organization of American States (OAS), indicating that the situation was not
yet a matter for the Security Council.22 ° A special commitment to Haiti
also stemmed from the U.N. role as an electoral observer,2 in the view
of some Member States. It was noted by others that it was not interference
in the internal affairs of Haiti because the legitimate constitutional
government of Haiti, presided over by Aristide, had called upon the
international community to respond.222 Others cited the growing refugee
problem.223
Mexico noted that it was essential to distinguish those problems that
are a "threat" to international peace and security, from those related to
national crises, such as the disruption of the institutional order or situations raising humanitarian concerns. Although both merit attention, Mexico
felt that to confuse the two raises institutional problems, given the clarity
with which the U.N. Charter establishes mandates.224 Mexico's statements
indicated that while the matter was of international concern, giving the

C. Arend, The United Nations and the New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 491 (1993). The Council
may have considered the matter more appropriate for regional resolution given the prominent
role played by the OAS. Moreover, the danger to the peace was not apparent. Finally, article
2(7) may have figured in the determination not to take action. Id.
218. Human Rights in Haiti, G.A. Res. 46/138, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/46/138 (1992); The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, G.A. Res. 47/20,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/47/20 (1992).
219. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 71st mtg. at 41-42, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.71 (1992). The
Venezuelan representative noted the concern of some Member States at including Haiti in the
work of the Security Council. But he judged it a potential threat to regional and international
peace and security. He noted the consequences of hundreds of thousands of impoverished
Haitians leaving Haiti for other countries. The tragedy, no longer confined to Haitian territory,
was already spilling over Haiti's borders. Id. at 47. France noted that the situation could not
fail to have an adverse impact upon the region. Id. at 52. The United States noted that the large
migrations were a potentially destabilizing element for other States in the region. Id. at 78.
• 220. Brazil stated that the situation was not a threat to the peace and security of the region,
but rather essentially of an internal nature and thus the most important forum to deal with it
directly was the OAS. Id. at 46-48, 63. Mexico stressed the need to strengthen regional organizations and the inadvisability of transferring the matter to the Security Council, given the
OAS actions thus far. Id.

221. Id. at 28 (United Kingdom).
222. Id. at 63.
223. Id. at 34-35 (Guyana), 47 (Venezuela).
224. Id. at 61. The Ambassador also noted that the fact that the Security Council does not
assume responsibility does not detract from its importance. Not all problems of concern to the
international community can be solved by recourse to the measures provided for in chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter.
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General Assembly a role, respecting the internal affairs of Haiti was of
some importance.
Regional sanctions proved insufficient and on June 16, 1993, the
Security Council, acting under chapter VII, imposed a mandatory embargo
on petroleum or petroleum-related products, until the Secretary General
determined that significant progress was made in resolving the political
crisis in Haiti.225 The objective was to force negotiations, particularly by
the military government, with the ultimate goal of restoring the Aristide
Government. As in Somalia, an assessment of this objective was complicated by the finding of a "threat" to the peace and the use of chapter VII
enforcement measures; both preclude application of article 2(7). But as
in Somalia, the showing of a "threat" to the peace should be high and the
"threat" should be evident. Moreover, the measures taken go beyond those
taken in Somalia by demanding, in the face of mandatory sanctions, the
return of a particular government to power
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold warned against employment of
U.N. elements in situations of an essentially internal nature, and this sound
advice should be taken.22 6 At a minimum, it means impartiality and
neutrality with respect to the underlying dispute.227 Professor Schachter
has cautioned against using U.N. agents or pressure to bring about the
victory of a particular faction or to determine the internal politics of a
State. 228 The potential for undermining such principles as sovereign
equality, political independence, and basic human rights is overwhelming.
Intervention which has the aim or effect of depriving the people of a
country from freely choosing their government or adopting their constitutional, economic, and social arrangements are incompatible with basic
tenets of the U.N. Charter. 229 Haiti represents a very difficult case because
Aristide clearly represented the choice of the people who elected him. It
is equally clear, however, that there is a minority that is powerful enough
to effectively deny him power. It may be up to internal political processes
to change this result. While the international community can assist by
isolating the military-led government, it is highly questionable whether
it should force this result through the use of mandatory sanctions, behind

225. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 27. The Resolution also imposed a ban on arms and related
material of all types and froze the overseas funds of the Government of Haiti. It relied upon

previous OAS resolutions and actions taken by the Secretary General of that Organization.
226. Nathanial L. Nathanson, Constitutional Crisis at the United Nations: The Price of
Peacekeeping, 11,33 U. CHI. L. REv. 249, 308 (1966).

227. Id.
228. Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force, supra note 32, at 83-84.
229. That the government has requested or agreed to such an intervention does not make

it less so. Id.
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the screen of a "threat" to the peace.23 Although the Council took pains
to stress the unique and exceptional circumstances of the situation in Haiti,
the decision remains problematic.
II.

THE CAPACITY TO TAKE ACTION

A. The Competency of Various Organs
Having settled that the United Nations will have jurisdiction in an
increasing number of internal conflicts, it must now be determined what
measures it can undertake. Professor Schachter has described ten functions
that the United Nations has performed in internal conflicts, ranging from
public debate and the expression of international concern, to sanctions and
enforcement measures.23' The organs that have carried out these objectives
are the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary
General.232 Each has a distinct role under the U.N. Charter and in prac233
tice, 23
and these roles often overlap. For example, both the Secretary
General 234 and the Security Council can act as third-party intermediaries,

230. If the international community decides to force results in similar circumstances, the
need for a more broadly representative Security Council and the articulation of norms becomes

acute.
231. Others include: (1) quiet diplomacy, good offices, and conciliation; (2) inquiry and
reporting; (3) assistance in ascertaining the "will of the people"; (4) on-the-spot observation and
surveillance; (5) consensual peace-keeping and technical cooperation; (6) economic assistance
and technical cooperation; (7) determination of governments entitled to representation in the
United Nations; and (8) the elaboration of norms and criteria of conduct. Schachter, U.N. &
Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 426-45.
232. The specialized agencies provide technical assistance. The International Court of
Justice, which is the principle legal organ of the United Nations, can decide legal disputes if
all parties consent to its jurisdiction. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 20, 1945,
arts. 1, 36, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060. Only States, not individuals or organizations may be parties
in cases before the Court. Id. art. 34(1), 59 Stat. at 1059.
233. See RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21. Whether or not a particular organ dominates at
a certain point in time depends on international politics. For instance, during the first ten years
of the United Nations, the General Assembly eclipsed the Security Council as a forum for airing
disputes and dealing with threats to the peace. Western viewpoints dominated and this shift was
essentially the U.S. response to Soviet vetoes in the Security Council. Id. at 192. This is
epitomized by the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950. G.A. Res 377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc A/l 775 (1951); see also infra note 241. As the General Assembly
expanded to include newly-independent States from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, this organ
began to vote against Western interests and became a tool to advocate and advance the concerns
of developing countries. See EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, VOL. 2: THE
AGE OF DECOLONIZATION 1955-1965, at 5-6 (1989). Consequently Western commentators and
States began to downplay the competency and significance of this organ by stressing, for
example, that it lacked authority to make binding law. Currently the center of power has shifted
back to the Security Council.
234. The Secretary General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations and
is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. U.N.
CHARTER art. 97; RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21, at 112. The Secretary General can bring any
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and facilitate discussion and informal consultations.23 5 Both the Security
Council and the General Assembly can express international concern.
Because internal conflicts often affect the peace, it is clear that the
Security Council is vested with the broadest range of powers in this arena
and the prerogatives of the other organs are limited in comparison.236 For
example, although the General Assembly can discuss any situation
regarding the maintenance of international peace and security brought
before it 237 and make recommendations,2

38

it cannot issue mandatory

decisions or take action with respect to these matters because "action" has
been defined as enforcement measures under chapter VII; such measures
are within the sole province of the Security Council. 239 Furthermore, while
the Security Council is exercising its functions under the Charter, the
General Assembly may not make recommendations with respect to that
dispute unless the Security Council so requests. 2'
Member States have explicitly conferred upon the Security Council
primary responsibility 24' for the maintenance of international peace and

matter which in his opinion threatens international peace and security to the attention of the
Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 99. This option was utilized by Secretary General Dag
Hammarskjold in the case of the Congo. The Secretary General can be a very important U.N.
dispute settlement resource, whether acting at the direction of the Security Council, the General
Assembly, on his own initiative or at the request of a party. Often acting as a third-party
intermediary, he can act without the disadvantages of extensive publicity and public debate.
RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21, at 193. Since these organs are dependent on reports prepared
by the Secretariat, the Secretary General can also be instrumental in shaping the character of
the debate and the options ultimately adopted.
235. As to the Security Council, see RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21, at 190. As for the
Secretary General, see BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note 10.
236. In An Agenda For Peace,Secretary General Boutros-Ghali prescribes broad roles for
the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, the Security Council and the
Secretariat. BOUTROs-GHALI, supra note 10.
237. Any Member or non-Member State may bring any dispute, or any situation which
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, to the attention of the General
Assembly. U.N. CHARTER arts. 34, 35.
238. Id. art. 11.
239. Id. art. 10.
240. U.N. CHARTER art. 12. The General Assembly may bring to the Security Council's
attention matters which are likely to endanger peace and security. U.N. CHARTER art. 11, 3.
241. In 1950, the General Assembly approved the Unitingfor Peace Resolution which gave
the General Assembly authority to make recommendations when there appears to be a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and the Security Council, because of
a lack of unanimity among its permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security. This includes recommendations for the
use of armed force in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression. Unitingfor Peace,
supra note 233. Given the apparent demise of the veto for the time being, it is unlikely this
resolution will be relevant in the near future. Still it is a residual source of authority for the
General Assembly if the veto reappears and has been utilized in such major U.N. undertakings
as the first U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF). See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 3, at 46 (citing G.A.
Res. 998(ES-I)95 authorizing peacekeeping forces in Egypt).
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security and the Council acts on their behalf in this field. 242 The
245
244
243
Council is granted specific authority in chapters VI, VII, VIII,
and X11 246 for the discharge of these duties, 7 and also possesses such
general powers as are commensurate with its responsibility to maintain
peace and security.248 The only limitations upon these very broad and
general powers are the fundamental principles and purposes of chapter 1,249
which tend to be abstract, general, difficult to apply, and sometimes
irreconcilable. 25
B. "Dangers" or "Threats" to the Peace
1. Overview
The drafters of the U.N. Charter foresaw two principal methods of
252
maintaining the peace: 251the collective measures described in chapter VII

242.
243.
244.
and acts
245.
246.

U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
Chapter VI prescribes procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes.
Chapter VII governs action in response to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
of aggression.
Chapter VIII delineates the Organization's relationship with regional organizations.
Chapter XII governs the almost defunct international trusteeship system.

247. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 2.
248. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 3, 52.
249. Id at 52. The purposes of the United Nations are delineated in article 1 and include
maintaining international peace and security; developing friendly relations among nations based
on the principles of equal rights and self-determination; international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, and humanitarian character, including the
promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights; and acting as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. Principles are
prescribed in article 2 and include recognition of the sovereign equality of States, the obligation
to settle disputes peacefully, a prohibition on the threat or use of force in international relations,
and noninterference in domestic matters. U.N. CHARTER art. 2. Carl-August Fleischhauer, UnderSecretary General of the United Nations and Legal Counsel, has characterized these principles
as a "veritable code of conduct," meant to go much further than mere declarations. They are
contained in a multilateral treaty and are therefore part of the treaty obligations of Member
States, including members of the Security Council. Carl-August Fleischhauer, Compliance &
Enforcement in the United Nations System, 85 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 428, 429-30 (1991).
250. General principles tend to be highly abstract and therefore applicable to an indeterminate series of events which extend outward from a core meaning. There are core cases
where they obviously apply, and a much larger number of situations where there are arguments
for and against their applicability. Because they are general and fundamental they tend to clash
with each other in specific cases. For instance, how do we reconcile self-determination and
territorial integrity? They compete because they express competing aims and interests of the
international community. Schachter, Law and Politics, supra note 89, at 191-92.
251. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
252. Under chapter VII, the Security Council determines the existence of a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. This finding need not
be explicit. Miller, supra note 108, at 4. For example, in authorizing the necessary military
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and the peaceful settlement measures recounted in chapter VI. 5 3 To carry
out these objectives, the Security Council was given immense, if not
unlimited powers, that include the option to authorize or use force.
Nevertheless, force can only be used if there is a "threat" to or "breach"
of the peace, or an "act of aggression." The Charter neither defines these
terms, nor those situations whose continuation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security.254 The Security Council
makes this determination 255 based on various considerations, which include
factual findings, interpretations of Charter provisions, and the weighing
of political considerations; the concepts employed are not solely legal in

assistance needed by the government of the Congo to meet it security needs, the Council did
not find a threat to the peace. U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 873d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
It has been argued that the Council acted under chapter VII, more specifically article 40, which
provides for provisional measures, and thus there was an implicit finding of a threat to the peace.
Miller, supra note 108, at 4-5. Moreover, the Council is not obligated to make such a finding
even if the facts indicate it is warranted. GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 352-54,
363-65. Upon such a finding, it can make recommendations or decide upon appropriate
measures under articles 41 and 42. Article 41 delineates nonforcible measures, such as economic
sanctions, severing diplomatic relations, and disrupting communications. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
If these measures prove to be inadequate, the Council can take action by air, sea, and land forces
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Id. art. 42.
253. "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead
to international friction or give rise to a dispute." U.N. CHARTER art. 34. Members and
nonmembers may bring such disputes to the Security Council. Id. art. 35. Nonmembers must
accept the obligations of peaceful settlement in advance. Id. The Security Council is not
obligated to discuss every complaint submitted to it. Potentially inflammatory debates have been
avoided by prior consultations and informal decisions not to place an item before the Council.
RIGGS & PLANO, supra note 21, at 190. For example, the Security Council refused to place
executions by the Franco regime in Spain on its agenda when requested by Mexico. Id. The
parties may also bring the dispute or situation to the General Assembly. U.N. CHARTER art. 35.
At any stage, the Security Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of
settlement. Id. art. 36, 1. If peaceful settlement measures fail, the parties are to refer the
dispute to the Security Council which can recommend appropriate procedures or methods of
settlement, if it finds that continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security. It can also recommend terms of settlement. Id. art. 37.
Pacific settlement includes negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies, and other peaceful means the parties might choose. Id.
art. 33. The parties to any dispute whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security obligate themselves to seek a solution through one of these
methods. Id. arts. 1, 33.
The measures in chapter VI are not mandatory, although Member States do obligate
themselves to settle their disputes peacefully. This paradigm affords the parties a third-party
mechanism to work out disputes, and it has been useful. Moreover, the investigatory function
permits the Security Council to determine at an early stage if disputes might endanger the peace.
See BOUTROs-GHALI, supra note 10.
254. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33, 39.
255. Id. art. 39; GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 156. Only the Security Council
can decide upon forcible measures, under articles 41 and 42. While the General Assembly
cannot take action, it does possess residual authority to maintain the peace, because the Security
Council's responsibility is primary, not exclusive. GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 345;
see also supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
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nature.256 The terms defining situations where force may be used have, in
fact, been used rather loosely, despite efforts to define them with some
precision.
257
No internal conflict has been found to be a "breach" of the peace,
or to rise to an "act of aggression.' 258 This is probably due to how these
conflicts have impacted upon international peace, and the manner in which
the Council has generally employed the terms "breach" of the peace 259 and
"act of aggression. ' 2 °

256. GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 351, 363. Given the unwillingness to utilize
the ICJ, the facts are only one determinant. The Council has also been motivated to settle the

dispute peacefully and avoid unnecessary difficulties in reaching a result. Thus, a finding may
or may not be made at a particular time to nudge the process forward, to prevent deterioration
of the situation, to avoid alienating a party, and so forth. States are also motivated by national
concerns and interests. See id. at 343-46.
257. The Council has generally been reluctant to find breaches of the peace, although when
such a finding has been made it has been accompanied by Council action. WHITE, supra note
37, at 37, 41. Various acts could be considered breaches of the peace. For instance, any resort
to armed force would suffice if it involved a military operation by one country against another.
Even when the use of armed force has gone beyond local skirmishes, however, Council members
have been reluctant to make a formal finding of a breach of the peace. This was probably due,
in many cases, to major power disagreement over the respective responsibilities of the parties
involved. GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 365. When North Korean forces crossed the
38th parallel and attacked South Korea, the Security Council determined that there had been
a breach of the peace. U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1501 (1950). Referring to General
Assembly Resolution 293 which recognized the government of the Republic of Korea based
in South Korea, the Council was able to view this as an international breach of the peace. If
North and South Korea had been seen as one country, temporarily separated by the 38th parallel,
it could have been viewed as a civil war. WHITE, supra note 37, at 45; see also Sohn, supra
note 4, at 209 (excepting this conflict from the civil war category).
258. Aggression, which is the most serious finding the Council can make, has been defined
by the General Assembly as the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or political independence of a State or in any manner inconsistent with the U.N.
Charter Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Annex, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/3314 (1974). In the case of an internal conflict, this might include aiding rebel forces,
an act which has been found to be in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter. Declarationon
Friendly Relations, supra note 31. A finding of an act of aggression labels or condemns one
party to the conflict as the guilty party, and consequently it has not been utilized on a regular
basis by the Security Council. WHITE, supra note 37, at 47. For instance, despite the almost
universal condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it was not labeled an act of aggression,
but a breach of international peace and security. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d
mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
259. Security Council resolutions on the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the
Falklands conflict, the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, did make such a
finding. In all of these cases, armies crossed international boundaries; the resort to armed force
across borders easily comes within the meaning of breach of the peace. This may not be the
case in intra-State conflicts where there is often no clear aggressor. MURPHY, supra note 62,
at 136.
260. Because it is such a powerful finding, the aggression must be clear. This is unlikely
in internal conflicts because any aid given is likely to be surreptitious and secretive. See
generally MURPHY, supra note 62, at 165. The Security Council has never made a finding of
indirect aggression. WHITE, supra note 37, at 48.
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2. "Threats" to the Peace
Internal conflicts have however been found to be "dangers" and
"threats" to the peace. "Threat" to the peace is a flexible concept that may
cover anything from intra-State situations to inter-State confrontation; 261
it was originally viewed as a precursor to a finding of a "breach" of the
peace.262 A number of internal situations have been found to be "threats"
to the peace because of intervention, or the potential for intervention, by
foreign forces. 263 Thus in the Congo, the presence of Belgian forces was
found to be a "threat" to the peace and the Council called for their
removal. 264 The same was true of the situation in Cyprus, where a Greekbacked coup was followed by a Turkish invasion of the northern part of
the island.265 If civil disorders are such that they invite foreign intervention, these disorders might also be "threats" to the peace; such was the
case in the Congo and Cyprus.266 Moreover, secession, if believed to be
foreign inspired, can be a "threat" to the peace.267 Internal struggles within

261. WHITE, supra note 37, at 41.
262. Id. at 44; GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 360-61. Both of these sources cite
the 1948 invasion of Palestine by surrounding Arab countries after the State of Israel was
proclaimed. The Security Council characterized the situation as a threat to the peace under article
39, ordered provisional measures under article 40, and found that a failure to comply would
demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace. WHITE, supra note 37, at 44.
263. If not for the Soviet veto, the Security Council probably would have found, in the
Greek complaint of December 1946, that support of armed bands formed in the territory of one
State and crossing into the territory of another, or the refusal of a government to take all
possible measures in its territory to deprive such bands of any aid or protection, should be
considered a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter. GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra
note 39, at 381.
264. S/4741, supra note 127, at 1.
265. The Security Council adopted Resolution 353 on July 20, 1961, which stated that there
was a serious threat to international peace and security and demanded an end to foreign
intervention. S.C. Res. 353, U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess., 1781st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/353
(1974); BLUE HELMETS, supra note 3, at 301.
266. Civil disorders may provoke a reaction to internal events by foreign States, versus
foreign inspired subversion. Schachter, U.N. & Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 401. As for
Cyprus, see U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., 1098th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/186 (1964), which classified
the violent eruptions on the island as likely to threaten international peace. This stemmed from
potential Greek and/or Turkish intervention, which was later realized when Turkey invaded
Cyprus. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. In the Congo, civil disorders prompted
Belgian intervention. Consequently, the Organization attempted to quell the disorders, restore
the ability of Congolese forces to undertake this responsibility, and called for the withdrawal
of Belgian troops. S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 873d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/143
(1960); S.C. Res. 145, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 879th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/145 (1960).
267. In the case of the Congo, it was widely believed that the secession of the province
of Katanga was inspired by Belgium, other Western Nations, and more particularly the Union
Miniere du Haut Katanga, all of -whom were interested in Katanga's vast mineral deposits.
Various actions by the indigenous population supported the idea that this may not have been
a genuine exercise of self-determination. See, e.g., FRANCK & CAREY, supra note 108, at 17;
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a State may also manifest international effects in the form of attacks upon
other States, as was the case in South Africa.268
3. "Dangers" to the Peace
Chapter VI, which prescribes peaceful settlement measures to deal
with "dangers" to the peace,269 was to apply to serious disputes, thus
distinguishing between disputes or situations of minor importance, and
those whose continuance might lead to a "breach" of the peace. 270 The
Security Council is afforded investigatory powers to make this determination and thus it has authority to concern itself with a dispute or situation
well in advance of it becoming an actual "threat" to the peace.' Through
investigatory organs established to keep them informed of developments
in disputes or situations, the Security Council can also determine if a
situation has deteriorated to the point where it has become a "threat" or
272
"breach" of the peace.
4. Discerning the Difference Between "Dangers"
and "Threats" to the Peace
The crucial question is determining when a dispute is a "danger" to
the peace where the recommendatory peaceful settlement mechanisms
requiring consent to intervention apply, versus a "threat" to the peace

Franck, supra note 108, at 648-49; Oscar Schachter, Preventing the Internationalization of
Internal Conflict: A Legal Analysis of the U.N. Congo Experience, 57 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC.
216, 223 (1963).
268. The internal struggle centered around Apartheid. The outward manifestations were

attacks upon neighboring States, which were sometimes harboring guerilla forces that were
struggling against Apartheid.
269. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 140. Article 2(3) generally and article 33
specifically, obligate U.N. Members to seek solutions to their serious disputes through pacific

means.
270. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1; GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 19, at 60. The Organization was not to undertake settlement of all disputes or situations; it was to concern itself
only with those which might lead to a breach of the peace. Id. at 60. Goodrich and Hambro
noted the difficulty in deciding whether a dispute is such that its continuance is likely to
endanger international peace. They postulated that disputes can become so persistent and bitter
that they poison international relations and create a political climate where States are tempted
to use force because the situation becomes unbearable. Alternatively, States acting in good faith
may become involved in a series of events which lead to the use of force without either party

initially desiring it. Disputes of this sort were to be dealt with by the Organization. Id. at 140.
271. U.N. CHARTER art. 34; GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 175-76. This
investigation may be on the Council's own initiative, following a formal request under article

35, or upon recommendation by the Secretary General under article 99.
272. GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 351. This was crucial in Korea where the
United Nations had the benefit of detailed reports from the U.N. Commission on Korea.
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where enforcement measures are permitted. 3 Past Security Council
practice makes discerning this difference difficult." 4
In its early years, the Council tried to distinguish between "dangers"
and "threats" to the peace by focusing on the immediacy of the situation.275 One analyst postulates that there is no longer a substantive, factual
distinction between a "danger" and a "threat" to the peace. Rather, the use
of a particular label may depend upon whether the Council is willing to
take mandatory measures or prefers to make nonbinding recommendations. 276 He mit
maintains that as mandatory measures became increasingly
impotent and unenforceable,277 findings of a "threat" to the peace became
more prolific.278 But mandatory measures are no longer unsubstantial, and

273. WHITE, supra note 37, explains that originally, there was to be a bridge between
chapters VI and VII. A situation that was a potential danger could become a threat if the parties
ignored article 36(1) recommendations or if those recommendations or article 33(1) procedures
failed. Thus, the scale of the conflict itself would not determine whether it was a threat, but
merely a failure to resolve it under chapter VI. This proposal was rejected only because it might
fetter the discretion of the Council.
274. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Article 31 delineates general rules of interpretation and provides that, together with the context,
we should take into account, inter alia, (a) any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty that establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, and (b) any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. Article 5
provides that the Convention applies to treaties that are the constituent instruments of
international organizations. The practice of an organization, which is not inconsistent with its
constituent instrument, can have legal effect. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 3.
275. The Fascist Franco regime in Spain prompted discussion on how immediate a threat
to the peace it posed. It was argued that a threat to the peace implied a state of affairs in which
there was a situation of potential danger that required steps by the Council. Whether a situation
fell under articles 39 or 34, depended on whether it was immediate or remote. GOODRICH &
SIMONS, supra note 39, at 355-56. The test appeared to be the immediacy of war or conflict.
Moreover, given the potential consequences of a chapter VII finding, there was probably some
reluctance to find a threat to the peace unless there was a real and immediate danger. WHITE,
supra note 37, at 37.
276. See WHITE, supra note 37, at 37 (maintaining that a threat to the peace merely may
be a legal tool for the imposition of mandatory sanctions).
277. The failure to conclude article 43 agreements meant that the Council did not have
armed forces at its disposal and thus had to rely on its power to exhort and recommend, rather
than its power to order. This tended to reduce the importance of the distinction between
measures taken under chapter VI and action taken under chapter VII. GOODRICH & SIMONS,
supra note 39, at 346.
278. Professor White uses as an example the situation in Southern Rhodesia when the Smith
regime unilaterally declared independence in 1965, with the intent of giving no political rights
to the black majority. WHITE, supra note 37, at 139. The first resolution mentioning international
peace and security stated that continuance of the situation constituted a threat to international
peace and security. U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., at 1, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (1965), reprinted
in JERICHO NKALA, THE UNITED

NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RHODESIAN

INDEPENDENCE CRISIS 241 (1985). Part of the reason chapter VII was not invoked may have
been the opposition of the United Kingdom. This resolution imposed a nonmandatory economic
embargo. Id. at 81. The next resolution found a threat to the peace because substantial supplies
of oil were reaching Southern Rhodesia by way of Portuguese Mozambique. Id.; U.N. SCOR,
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thus this thesis may no longer be useful.279 Consequently, it might be
logical to begin delineating a line between the two once more, given the
now genuine difference in measures that can be taken under these
chapters. On the other hand, this must be balanced with flexibility to
address the myriad situations that the Council will face.28°
5. Application to Current Conflicts
In the current international milieu, the willingness or reluctance to
undertake certain kinds of action will undoubtedly continue to influence
Security Council findings on "threats," as opposed to "dangers," to the
peace. But given the limited resources at the disposal of the Council, and
the numerous internal struggles in progress or in utero, the immediacy and
seriousness of the conflict might again be a worthwhile determinant.
Finding a "danger" to the peace might also be a useful precursor to
finding "threats" to the peace in these disputes. Investigations and factual
determinations, which admittedly have political overtones, can assist in
determining the immediacy and seriousness of the conflict. Moreover,
chapter VI affords a broad handle for the Secretary General whose good
offices should be strengthened.28'

21st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966). This resolution was passed at the request of the United
Kingdom, which desired chapter VII authority to use force to stop ships about to unload large
quantities of oil that would be pumped via pipelines to Southern Rhodesia. NKALA, supra, at
91-99. The resolutions imposing mandatory economic sanctions found the situation in Southern
Rhodesia to be a threat to the peace and the Security Council imposed mandatory economic
sanctions under chapter VII. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 232, supra note 43; U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (1968) and subsequent resolutions, finding the requisite threat to
international peace and imposing mandatory Council decisions under chapter VII. All enforcement measures, from 1966 on were of a nonmilitary nature and the resolution of 1968 was not
only mandatory, but comprehensive, covering a broad range of Rhodesian economic activity.
Yet these sanctions were widely breached.
279. Depending on the situation, enforcement measures may involve the use of military
force against a State. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 814, supra note 26, authorizing the use of force against
Somalia. Of course, some resolutions remain unenforced, such as recent exhortations on the
situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina where the Council has demanded that military actions cease,
while the war continues in full force. John F. Burns, Bosnia loses Any Hope of Being Saved,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, § 4, at 1, 6.
280. The drafters gave the Council broad discretion to take whatever action was appropriate
when maintaining the peace. It could concentrate on peaceful settlement or adjustment; utilize
provisional measures to prevent the situation from deteriorating or to create conditions favorable
to peaceful settlement; or use coercive measures to suppress any act of aggression. The
responsible organs were authorized to use whatever methods, in whatever order or combination
seemed most likely under the circumstances, to achieve the desired end. GOODRICH & SIMONS,
supra note 39, at 344.
281. BOUTROs-GHALI, supra note 10, at 20. As a method of furthering the peaceful
settlement of international disputes, the good offices of the Secretary General include: (1) forms
of diplomatic assistance such as informal contacts and consultation with parties to a dispute;
(2) diplomatic action designed to express international concern, induce the parties into talks and
assist them in finding a suitable framework for settlement; (3) mediation, conciliation, and
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The Security Council should not, and probably cannot, intervene in
a major fashion in all civil unrest. 282 Rather, the Council should seriously
consider not only whether there is an international impact, but also the
nature of that impact upon world peace. The investigatory powers
accorded to the Council in article 34 should be broadly utilized to
determine what is actually transpiring in any particular case,28 3 and how
it might affect world peace. For international mobilization of a military
or nonmilitary nature, internal strife should approach some threshold it should at least be an immediate and actual "threat" to international
peace.28 4
In distinguishing between "dangers" and "threats" to the peace,
Professor Szasz's criteria for internationalizing a conflict28" are a sound
starting point, for in many of these circumstances the possibility of outside
intervention, and thus a "danger" or "threat" to the peace in the form of
inter-State conflict, is elevated. Yet, notwithstanding that many of these
categories will make more conflicts of international concern,286 they do
not necessarily make them "threats" to the peace. For instance, while
human rights violations are a broader category warranting a widening of
international concern, such abuses do not necessarily invite outside
intervention or cause regional instability. 287 Rather, whether this result
transpires depends upon how surrounding States react. Depending on
religious or ethnic sensitivities or the particular geopolitics of the region,

coordination; and (4) inquiries, factfinding, the supervision of plebiscites, elections, or referenda,
and the determination of legal rights and duties in a specific situation. B.G. Ramcharan, The
Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary General in the Field of Human Rights, 76 AM.
J. INT'L L. 130, 132 (1982) (quoting V. PECHOTA, THE QUIET APPROACH: A STUDY OF GOOD
OFFICES EXERCISED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE

13 (UNITAR

1972)). Mediation implies an effort by an outside party to assist the disputants in reaching a
solution. Conciliation is generally defined as a process instituted by the parties themselves who
agree to submit their dispute to a specially-constituted organ for investigation and efforts to
effect a settlement. See GOODRICH & SIMONS, supra note 39, at 292.
282. Besides political and legal constraints, there are monetary restraints. Ian Davidson,
Peace, But Not at Any Price, FIN. TIMES (London), June 19, 1993, at 8.
283. Edward C. Luck, Making Peace, 89 FOR. POL'Y, Winter 1992-93, at 137, 143-44.
284. Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force, supra note 32, at 86.
285. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
287. Lori F. Damrosch, Commentary on Collective MilitaryIntervention to Enforce Human
Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 30, at 215. Mass
killings do not necessarily prompt intervention. For instance, in China, which is a permanent
member of the Security Council with a veto, there was little likelihood of intervention when
over a thousand students were massacred in Tienanman Square. The uprising was of short
duration, there was little likelihood of a spill-over across international borders, and no possibility
of intervention.
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such abuses may or may not cause grave difficulties and unrest in the
region, or prompt a massive exodus which may, or may not, depending
upon various factors cause a "danger" or "threat" to the peace.288 Thus,
unless we are prepared to say that human rights abuses of a certain kind
or intensity are, in and of themselves a "danger" or "threat" to the peace,
their impact upon the region and international community as a whole must
be assessed.289
If a conflict is of significant size, intensity, or length, there is more
likelihood of human rights violations and an increased potential to cross
international borders. 2' This might increase pressures for intervention by
other States,29' depending upon the circumstances.292 Generally, as the
level of intensity of many of these elements increases, the likelihood of
other elements becoming applicable also multiplies and together these
factors make the situation more likely to be at least a "danger" to the

288. The massive exodus of Iraqi Kurds would be an example of human rights abuses
causing at least a "danger", and perhaps an actual "threat" to the peace.
289. See Scheffer, supra note 29, who makes the case for collective humanitarian
intervention. Scheffer notes that threats to the peace were found in the racist policies of South
Africa and Rhodesia and in the civil war in Iraq, which triggered the mass migrations of Kurds
and Shiites across Iraqi borders. This was the finding even though all of the fighting occurred
in Iraq. The civil wars in Somalia and Yugoslavia were also found to be threats to the peace.
Yet Scheffer acknowledges that there is still considerable opinion that limits the premise for
Security Council action within sovereign borders. Nonetheless, he argues for classifying largescale humanitarian crises as presumptive threats to the peace. The notion of security has been
expanding to embrace ethnic and environmental problems. The heightened recognition of
ethnicity in the aftermath of the Cold War means more is at stake when an ethnic group within
a State is subjected to mass violations of human rights because it is now more likely to trigger
the ethnic group at large to react violently. Moreover, he asserts that experience shows that the
invariable effect of massive violations of human rights is: (1) large refugee migrations; (2)
internal armed conflicts that ultimately spill across national borders and trigger broader armed
conflicts; (3) dangerous pressures on the availability and distribution of regional resources; or
(4) transnational environmental and health problems. Scheffer also asserts that the obligation
of States to comply with international human rights diminishes the necessity of defining a threat
to the peace as a cross-border phenomenon. How a nation treats its peoples within its borders
has become a legitimate matter of international inquiry and if necessary, intervention. Id. at
287-88.
In this author's opinion, the debates on the adoption of Resolution 688 would appear to
indicate otherwise. But with the recent resolutions on Somalia, perhaps the Security Council
is moving in this direction. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
290. Such spillover may include a massive outflow of refugees. Moreover, in a long,
intense conflict, it is likely that other States in the area will have some, and perhaps a growing,
interest whether it is based on historical, ethnic, or political ties or due to fears of regional instability or refugees.
291. For instance, in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Muslim States have attempted to smuggle
weapons to Bosnian Muslims, while Serbian support for Serbian Bosnians has been the subject

of Security Council sanctions. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/757
(1992); see also Hugh Pope, Turks Call for Weapons from Islamic Nations, INDEPENDENT

(London), Jan. 12, 1993, at 8; Claude Van England, Islamic States' Concern for Bosnia,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1992, at 6.

292. Damrosch, supra note 287.
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peace.293 In light of rising ethnic and religious sensitivities, the possibility
of regional instability and fomenting disturbances in other States may also
legitimately make a particular situation a "danger" or "threat" to the peace.
The situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina represents the extreme case of
an internal conflict that is fraught with outside intervention and has the
potential to trigger a major international conflagration. 294 The predicament
in Bosnia is partly due to the excruciatingly painful breakup of the State
of Yugoslavia. This has been compounded because Yugoslavia is comprised of multiple ethnic groups with a long, turbulent, and sometimes
violent history. Bosnians hail from three ethnic groups, two of which,
Serbs and Croats, do not want to be minorities in a multiethnic State and
have loyalties to the adjoining States of Yugoslavia and Croatia, where
their ethnic groups are based. Consequently, intervention by another State,
however surreptitious, was almost assured.
The remaining group, Bosnian Muslims, have aroused the support of
Muslim States on religious grounds, raising the possibility of additional
intervention. 295 There have been massive human rights abuses, which have
included rape camps, concentration camps, and massive bombardments
of civilian targets. Moreover, the length and intensity of the conflict has
caused unrest in a region which is already unstable because of the fall of
communism and the rise of many new and sometimes unstable republics.
Additional fighting in Macedonia was determined to be enough of a
possibility that U.N. troops were deployed in that State.296 A major
conflagration in Kosovo has been actively discussed; 297 this could bring
in additional countries, such as Albania, Greece, and Turkey.
The situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina has all of the elements of a

293. For example, increasing intensity may lead to severe human rights abuses. Human
rights abuses alone, or in combination with increasing size, may lead other States to want to
intervene.
294. Some have termed this an international war because of outside intervention by Croatia

and Yugoslavia. This is correct given the admission of all of these nations to the United Nations.
But the wars in Croatia and Bosnia are also part and parcel of the breakup of Yugoslavia, which
partly explains the initial hesitation by the Security Council to become involved at all.
295. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Balkan Web: Unraveling A Region's Tangled History:
The Alliances That Make Peacekeeping Perilous,WASH. POST, May, 9, 1993, at C4; Iran Offers
Help to Bosnian Muslims, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 6, 1992, at 2; Peter Grier, West
Downplays Iran's Bid to Send Troops to Bosnia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 16, 1993, at

2.
296. R.C. Longworth, U.S. Troops Face Unique Role: Mission in Macedoniais "Preventive
Deployment," CHICAGO TRIB., June 15, 1993, at 7; 300 U.S. Troops in Macedonia to Try to
Contain Balkan War, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at AI0.
297. Roger Cohen, Fear of The Serbs Spreads in the South, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1993,
at D5; Paul Lewis, U.N. Near Accord on Plan to Watch Serbian Frontier,N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 1993, at Al; Bujar Bukoski, Kosovo's Plea for Help, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 30,

1993, at 19.
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potential powder keg of major proportions. It presents a classic case of
an internal conflict that is a grave "threat" to international peace and
would suggest the kind of situation where the Council could act to the
very limits of its powers, including forcible and nonforcible enforcement.29
On the other hand, there is Somalia, truly an horrific situation, that
is characterized by anarchy and massive human rights abuses in that the
population is being denied access to food, medicine, and other relief
supplies. Undoubtedly, this makes the situation of international concern.
Moreover, the outflow of refugees is another international effect and this
spillover also makes it of international concern. What is not clear is what
makes it a "threat" to the peace. In December 1992, the Security Council
authorized the use of force in order to effect the delivery of humanitarian
assistance in Resolution 814.299 No impact upon the region was specifically mentioned in the Resolution. During the debates on the Resolution,
States mentioned, the danger to regional stability and the refugee
problem.3° Yet it did not appear that refugees were causing other States
to contemplate intervention. 30 ' Nor did it appear that Somalis were
attacking other States. It also did not seem to be the kind of situation
which "makes men's blood boil," as in South Africa and Rhodesia, where
racist policies inflamed the passions of surrounding African nations, who
eventually gave aid and comfort to resistance movements. Nor was the
situation causing instability in surrounding States.30 2 Given no present or

298. To date, the Security Council has passed 38 resolutions on Bosnia and Hercegovina
alone. It has deployed peacekeeping forces, see S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th
mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992), and imposed a mandatory embargo against Serbia. Yet
in the initial stages of Security Council involvement in Yugoslavia, where it addressed the
situation in Croatia, there was some debate over whether this was an internal matter, within the
domestic jurisdiction of Yugoslavia. A number of States specifically cited the request of the
government of Yugoslavia as a basis for taking up the matter. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3009th mtg. at 28, 36-38, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009 (1992). While Regional efforts to resolve the
situation were ongoing, the potential for major and grave regional consequences were well
known. See Weller, supra note 46, at 579.
299. See supra notes 26, 185-87 and accompanying text. Acting under chapter VII,
Resolution 814 authorized the use of all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.
300. S/PV.3145, supra note 188, at 19-20 (Cape Verde's statement regarding stability of
the region), 33 (United Kingdom's statement regarding refugees).
301. A later report by the Secretary General does mention some of the pressures on
neighboring States caused by an influx of refugees.
302. There have only been hints of the impact the situation in Somalia is having on
neighboring States. For instance, in his report of January 26, 1993, the Secretary General
referred to growing concern over the movement of technical personnel into border areas with
Kenya and Ethiopia. The problems created by armed gangs in refugee camps in Kenya had
prompted authorities to threaten to expel Somali refugees residing in that country. He noted the
destabilizing effect of such movements into these countries and the threat they pose for any
future stability in Somalia and concluded that they are matters which must be addressed. The
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threatened direct transborder military effects, the "threat" to the peace had
to be found elsewhere. °3 It appears, therefore, that the humanitarian crisis
in and of itself was the "threat" to the peace in Somalia. 3° This is indeed
an expanded definition of "threat" to the peace.
Haiti took this expansion a step forward. Here the Security Council
found a "threat" to the peace and ordered mandatory sanctions until a
settlement was reached on restoring Aristide to power. °5 While the region
has responded to the coup against Aristide en masse, it has been accomplished peacefully through the use of economic sanctions. There have
been no intimations that any State contemplates military or any other kind
of intervention in Haiti. Nor is the Haitian regime threatening its neighbors. There were human rights abuses, but they were not the focus of the
Resolution and, while serious and not to be minimized, they certainly were
not on the level of those in Somalia. °6 While there has been a large
exodus of refugees from. Haiti, it has been mainly to the United States,
which is neither likely to invade Haiti for this reason nor to experience
instability from the influx.30 7 Consequently, the finding of a "threat" to
the peace seems to have been the existence of the regime itself. This is
quite a startling conclusion given that the government has threatened none
of its neighbors. This suggests that "threat to the peace" is almost

Situation in Somalia: Prngress Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. at 8,
45, U.N. Doc. S/25168 (1993) [hereinafter ProgressReport of the Secretary GeneralS/25168].

In determining the deployment of UNOSOM II, he recommended that Somalia's borders be
included for the purpose of controlling the movement of refugees, to prevent the illicit
introduction of arms into Somalia and to avoid destabilization of neighboring countries. Report
of Secretary-General S/25354, supra note 186, at 21, 97. Whether this situation rises to a
"threat" to the peace is at the least debatable.
303. The Secretary General acknowledged that the situation in Somalia was primarily of

a domestic nature, but he observed that it could affect the peace and stability of the entire region
of which Somalia forms an integral part, unless energetic and timely action is taken to avert
a major humanitarian and security disaster. Report of the Secretary-GeneralS/25354, supranote

186, at 22,

97.

304. In his recommendations on the mandate of UNOSOM 1I,the Secretary General sought
authority for appropriate action, including enforcement action as necessary, to establish
throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. Report of SecretaryGeneral S/25354, supra note 186, at 22. It also would empower UNOSOM 1I to provide
assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political
life, reestablishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation,
recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's
economy and infrastructure. Id.

305. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
306. The Resolution noted, with concern, the humanitarian crisis, which included the mass
displacement of populations, which was aggravating the threat to the peace. S.C. Res. 841, supra
note 27.
307. The United States has permitted few Haitians to enter the United States, contending
that they are economic rather than political refugees. While this position has spurred some
debate, sparked a few demonstrations against U.S. policy, and generated court challenges, it

certainly has not led to internal instability.
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incapable of definition at this point, although it is notable that the use of
force was not authorized to implement the embargo.' °s
Haiti was defined as a unique and exceptional situation warranting
extraordinary measures by the Security Council in support of the efforts
undertaken within the framework of the OAS.3"9The Council determined
that in these unique and exceptional circumstances, the continuation of this
situation threatened international peace and security. 310 But as former
Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar has noted, a principle invoked
in a particular situation, but disregarded in a similar one, is as good as no
principle at all. 3 t While Haiti can be distinguished as a unique attempt
to assist regional efforts, it does contribute to difficulties in determining
the parameters of "threat" to the peace.
Both of these situations differ from the Kurdish crisis in Iraq. There,
the Iraqi suppression of the rebellion was found to be a "threat" to the
peace.3t 2 But this finding was made against the backdrop of a massive
exodus of refugees from an ethnic group that forms a large and restless
minority in the surrounding States to which the refugees were fleeing.
That a massive inflow of such refugees could cause difficulties with
minorities within these States is quite plausible. Moreover, border incursions had taken place and massive numbers of military personnel were in
the area in the aftermath of a devastating war; tensions were high. A
finding of a "danger" or "threat" to international peace is much more
plausible in these circumstances. It is also notable that even in this volatile
situation, the use of force was not specifically authorized.
Resolution 688 was relied upon, however, to carry out military
measures. This reliance is clearly misplaced, and went beyond the text of
the Resolution and probably beyond what most members who voted in
its favor contemplated. In August 1992, the United States and its allies
established a no-fly zone over Southern Iraq, allegedly to protect portions
of the Iraqi population from repression by the government of Saddam

308. Measures to enforce the embargo militarily were omitted because of objections by
Brazil and other Latin American States. Brazil Prolongs Haiti's Agony, N.Y. TiMES, June 16,

1993, at A26.
309. The Council relied upon the request of the Permanent Representative of Haiti, and
took action within the context of related actions previously taken by the OAS and the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
310. It seems that Haiti's chronic instability, by generating waves of refugees, affected
regional stability. Howard W. French, U.N. Approves Ban on Shipments of Oil to Haitian
Military, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1993, at Al; Peter Pringle, Haiti Faces Worldwide UN Oil

Embargo, INDEPENDENT (London), June 17, 1993, at 13. Human rights abuses had led to an
exodus of people and consequent destabilization of the region.
311. Secretary General'sAddress at the University of Bordeaux, supra note 3.

312. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 28.
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Hussein.3" 3 These countries relied on Resolution 688 for authority,
claiming that the Resolution demanded that Hussein end the repression
of the Iraqi people, and hence, individual countries were permitted to
enforce the Resolution. 314 Given that there is no mention of chapter VII
in the Resolution and no authorization to use force, this interpretation is
questionable at best.311 Opposition and misgivings over the no-fly zone
centered on the dismemberment of Iraq and resulting regional3 7instability,3 16
as well as violations of the territorial sovereignty of Iraq.
6. The Need for Standards
The preceding case studies indicate a need for delineating some
standards for determining if there is a "threat" to the peace, whether they
expand past definitions or adherence to past practice.318 The supreme
function of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and
security and this should form the first question asked - is a particular
situation a "danger" or "threat" to international peace and security; the
319
distinct possibility that it is neither must be included in this assessment.

313. John H. Cushman Jr., Saudis in Supporting Role to Allied Flights Over Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1992, at A10; Caryle Murphy, U.S. Planes Begin Missions Over Iraq:
Enforcement of 'No-Fly Zone' Starts Without Resistance, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1991, at A1;
Michael Wines, U.S. andAllies Say Flight Ban in Iraq Will Start Today, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
1992, at A14
314. Excerpts from Bush's Talk.- IraqiAir Zone is Off-Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992,
at A14.
315. The only remotely plausible case to be made is the finding of a threat to the peace
arising from the consequences of the repression, and the demand for access by humanitarian
workers. But chapter VII is conspicuously absent and, at the very least, there should be an
explicit authorization to use force of any type. The general U.N. expression is to give
authorization "to use all necessary means." This authorization is explicit in previous resolutions
regarding Iraq and subsequent resolutions on Somalia and. Bosnia-Hercegovina.
316. Gerald Butt, Former Gulf War Allies Give Lukewarm Response to West's Stand on
Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 28, 1992, at 1; Lucia Mouat, Behind the No-Fly-Zone
Strategy: Dwindling CoalitionAgainst Iraq,CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Sept. 1, 1992, at 1; Tony
Walker, Iraq Warns Arabs of Retaliation over "No Fly" Zone, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 28,
1992, at 3.
317. Michael R. Gordon, Warning to Baghdad:The Shiites are IraqisFirst,Not Separatists,
Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at A14; Claude Van England, Iran Welcomes Plans
to Protect Shiites, But Blasts Partition,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 25, 1992, at 3.
318. Of course, these are just suggested guidelines. It is up to the Security Council to make
this determination under articles 39 and 37 and it must be afforded some flexibility in this task.
319. The assumption is usually that intervention will undoubtedly improve the situation,
but this is not inevitably the case. Practically, military force may not be an effective instrument
against most kinds of human rights violations. Mass intra-State violations may be less amenable
to military solution that past U.N. military operations which involved measures such as acting
as a buffer force between opposing States. Moreover, violators are often the military and thus
the interposition of another army (the United Nations) could be counterproductive. Damrosch,
supra note 287, at 220-21; Stephen J. Stedman, The New Interventionists, FOREIGN AFF., Dec.
1992 (America and the World 1992/93 issue), at 1.
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This is a difficult and highly political question to answer. Yet a factual
investigation of the situation, including consultations with surrounding
States, would assist in making this finding.32 ° How the matter comes
before the Security Council may be telling. For instance, if States in the
region are requesting mediation or assistance, this may indicate an
international impact that is a "danger" to the peace. Similarly, if the
Secretary General believes it may be a "danger" to the peace and warrants
investigation, this would indicate that there is some reason to consider it
for chapter VI measures. On the other hand, if it is only the State concerned or an internal faction, this may indicate that it is not a "danger"
or "threat" to the peace.
While it is highly unlikely, if an investigation reveals that a situation
is unquestionably internal and not affecting surrounding States in a way
that makes it possible that inter-State violence will erupt, the conflict
should be resolved by the State involved, with the assistance of the
Secretary General if desired.32' Peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms
can be made available in the case of any breach of the peace, whether it
is international or internal, at the option of Member States or insurgent
factions, although presumably there would be opposition to such a
prerogative in favor of rebel factions if the matter is unquestionably
internal.322
A request for conciliation or mediation would not constitute interference in the domestic affairs of a State if it occurs with the consent of
all the parties involved, because in the absence of other Charter prohibitions, consent vitiates domestic jurisdiction objections. Problems arise if
one party refuses to take part while the other desires assistance in resolving the situation. This becomes more complex when a rebel group
seeks assistance in reaching a settlement with an established government. 323 In the absence of even a "danger" to the peace, the Security
320. It seems advisable to investigate, because the earlier peaceful settlement measures can
be utilized, the better. It makes sense to strengthen and broaden the investigatory organs of the
United Nations and the General Assembly appears to believe this is a useful step. Declaration
on Fact-Findingby the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of InternationalPeace

and Security, G.A. Res. 46/59, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 290, U.N. Doc.
A/46/49 (1991).
321. The General Assembly might also have a role if it is of international concern. The
mediation and conciliation mechanisms available through the Secretariat, however, might be
more useful.
322. While utilizing these dispute settlement mechanisms at the option of Member States
may not be objectionable, such an option at the disposal of opposition factions, such as ethnic
minorities desiring secession, probably would be.
323. Such would have been the case if, for instance, the students at Tiennaman Square had
requested U.N. assistance in their uprising against the Chinese government. If the Chinese
government refused, and relied upon article 2(7), it is unlikely the United Nations would prove
useful.
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Council would clearly have no jurisdiction. In the absence of international
concern or some "danger" to the peace, it is doubtful that other organs
would assume
jurisdiction in any meaningful manner if the affected State
324
opposed it.
If an internal threat is not even a "danger" to the peace, the Security
Council would have no jurisdiction under the present U.N. Charter. But
given the broad manner in which the more weighty term "threat" to the
peace is being defined, it is likely that many conflicts will be found to be
at least a "danger" to the peace. The Council, in its discretion, can simply
find a "danger" to the peace, given that the term is not defined in the
Charter and has been broadly interpreted.325 What constitutes a "danger"
to the peace is a flexible concept but would seem to encompass serious
disputes, international friction, or situations in which a large enough
number of States (especially those in the affected region) view it as a
matter of grave international concern.
Given Security Council findings in Somalia, and especially Haiti,
almost all internal strife can probably be termed a "danger" to the peace.
Because of the wide range of useful options available here, a consensus
is likely to emerge that brings most internal conflicts within this category,
especially given the expanding definition of "threat" to the peace. Moreover, because chapter VI jurisdiction is dependent on consent and
consists of recommendations, few would see article 2(7) as a barrier.
While article 2(7) would not bar Security Council jurisdiction, it
should shape what action is ultimately taken. The Security Council should
limit measures to ensuring that the potential for a "threat" to international
peace is not realized. Particular attention should be paid to the reactions
and actions of States in the region and, where appropriate and useful,
assistance by regional organizations should play a prominent role.326
Security Council and Secretary General measures might include conciliation, mediation, good offices, and other forms of peaceful settlement as
well as recommendations to other States not to interfere in the dispute.

324. The General Assembly might pass resolutions, as it did during the initial stages of
the Haitian debacle. Moreover, regional organizations might play a pivotal role as did the OAS
in Haiti.
325. See supra notes 269-80 and accompanying text.
326. It should be clear that this course of action takes place with the free will of the parties,

and the parties must be in agreement as to support from the appropriate regional organization
acting in place of the United Nations. The Charter provides for the input of regional organizations in chapter VIII. U.N. CHARTER ch. VIII. Some regional organizations may be dominated
by a particular regional power and thus may not be honest brokers in potential disputes. Further,
some regional organizations are comparatively weak and not able to assist in many disputes.
On the other hand, the Council has left some conflicts primarily to regional groups, such as the

civil war in Liberia.
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If all of the parties agree and give their consent, the introduction of
peacekeeping forces would be permissible if the situation were ripe for
such forces.327
Non-State parties should also be permitted to appeal to the Organization for assistance. Including non-State parties would be in accord
with the evolution towards increasing the rights of individual and nongovernmental entities on the international stage.328 Since the ultimate
objective is to settle disputes peacefully, efforts should be made not only
to include all relevant parties, but to permit any party desiring a peaceful
settlement to appeal to the United Nations.
Affording non-State parties access to U.N. proceedings is not without
precedent. Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council
permits the Council to invite "other persons" to supply information or give
assistance. During the first twenty-five years of the Council's deliberations
few groups testified. But beginning in 1971, liberation movements have
been invited to participate in debates on issues directly concerning them.329
In 1972, this concept was widened and now includes anyone whom the
majority of members wish to hear.330 Support for national liberation
movements led to attempts to confer some of the benefits of the international legal system upon national liberation groups.33 1

327. This.would mean some of the parties have or are close to a settlement and assistance
is needed in its implementation. At a minimum, the fighting must have stopped, because
peacekeeping forces do not have the authority to use force. Generally, they have been employed
to patrol borders, keep factions apart, and monitor cease fires. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 3,
at 4-5.
328. John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutionsfor a New Age,
81 GEO. L. J.535, 538-40 (1993). In the postwar era, the scope of international law expanded
from nation States to international and regional organizations, and then increasingly to persons,
whether as individuals or corporations. The rights of the individual have expanded most
markedly in the human rights arena. Id. Individuals can, in some instances, bring individual
claims for human rights violations before international committees. See generally GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992). Admittedly, this
is only permitted if a State gives its consent by adopting optional protocols to the instruments
according these rights. Sian Lewis-Anthony, Treaty-basedProceduresfor Making Human Rights
Complaints Within the U.N. System, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE,
supra, at 41-2, 49, 52. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
59, U.N. Doc. 16316 (1966).
329. SYDNEY DAWSON BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 138-39
(1988).
330. Id. at 139. This has included a variety of organizations, such as the League of Arab
States, the Pan Africanist Congress, the African National Congress, the South West Africa
People's Organization, and others. Individuals have included mayors, clerics, and politicians.
Id.
331. Hargrove, supra note 70, at 113, 123. In 1975, Egypt asked that the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) be invited to participate. The invitation conferred on the PLO
the same rights of participation conferred when a Member State is invited to participate. The
United States opposed the invitation and some have questioned whether it was in accordance
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Moreover, previous U.N. efforts to mediate conflicts have included
nonrecognized groups which are parties to a conflict, such as leaders of
rebellious groups, exercising de facto control over a region, or rival
claimants to central government authority.332 This practice has probably
been facilitated by the General Assembly and Security Council practice
of receiving statements of nongovernmental leaders or nonrecognized
authorities with the understanding that there are no implications as to
recognition.333 Because recognizing and legitimizing insurgents may be
problematic in soliciting State cooperation, this can be ameliorated by
explicitly acknowledging that including such parties in negotiations in no
way prejudges the final outcome of the political settlement. While this
solution will be of limited usefulness if the affected State vociferously
objects, it may bring parties to the table, if for some reason the government does not take this step or if there are questions regarding who
actually governs.
At the next level, a "threat" to international, peace and security, the
Security Council unquestionably has jurisdiction and has more means at
its disposal to deal with the matter at hand.334 In determining whether there
is a "threat" to the peace, the impact of the situation on surrounding States
should be considered. Incursions by armed forces across borders, massive
outflows of refugees which cause unbearable tensions in surrounding
States, the stirring of ethnic or other tensions in neighboring States, the
threat or actuality of outside intervention in response to human rights
abuses or for other reasons, and regional or more extensive geopolitical
effects would all seem to be determinative. The immediacy of these events
might also be a factor to distinguish between potential and actual "threats"
to the peace. Bosnia-Hercegovina appears to be the classic case of an
internal war that is a "threat" to international peace and security; it
possesses all of the aforementioned elements. Haiti, on the other hand,
possesses few and truly represents a broader use of the term.
Of course, if there is a "threat" to the peace, the Security Council can
mandate or recommend appropriate measures.335 Except in the most dire

with the spirit or letter of the Rules of Procedure. BAILEY, supra note 329, at 131. RICHARD
KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING

170-75 (2d ed. 1993).

332. Schachter, U.N. & Internal Conflict, supra note 4, at 427.

333. Id.
334. Consent is no longer a legal issue because the Council may be taking mandatory
decisions. Consent may still be useful, both practically and politically. Still, it is when consent

is not forthcoming that the Council is more likely to find a threat, versus a danger, to the peace.
335. For instance, the Council might call for provisional measures which attempt to halt
the fighting and give the parties an opportunity to work out their differences. It might also
decide that all States are to refrain from intervention of all kinds, and to channel all responses
from the international community through the Council. If circumstances warrant, nonforcible
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situations, however, a settlement should not be imposed. To force a
settlement upon warring factions might undermine other Charter provisions, such as the right of self-determination,336 and the sovereignty and
political independence of States.337 Moreover, in the long run it may be
untenable and not contribute to lasting peace. Of course, in some circumstances, a temporary ceasefire or imposition of peace may be desirable
and necessary because of the impact of the situation on the region. A
particular party may block those efforts and in those circumstances, a
settlement might be imposed. This might be the case in BosniaHercegovina, where the war is having a severe impact on the region, and
with respect to General Aidid in Somalia.
The most difficult questions arise with the introduction of forces
without the consent of the parties involved, and with the authority to use
force. 338 These are really enforcement actions and should be treated
accordingly. If the international community truly believes there is a
distinction between peace enforcement and chapter VII enforcement, these
distinctions should be resolved.339 Peace enforcement involves the use of
force against a State or against warring factions that are trying to assume
the power of the State. Moreover, unlike traditional peacekeeping, it is
imposed without consent. It is possible to either continue to stretch the
concept of self-defense or to make distinctions as to whether it is the use
of force against a State. 340 Rather, these decisions should be made under
chapter VII because they have enormous consequences and, even in this

measures might be employed first, such as an arms or general embargo against the State where
the situation is centered, or against other States that are exacerbating the situation or refuse to
desist. In addition, all of the peaceful settlement mechanisms of the Organization should be put

at the disposal of the parties.
336. While the "peoples right to self-determination" is a concept in the midst of reformulation, the cries for independence emanating from various groups cannot be ignored despite
the perceived need for stability and territorial sovereignty. To do so only postpones, not solves
underlying demands. In these circumstances, perhaps we must sometimes permit some breaches
of domestic peace, albeit with limits, such as when it involves massive human rights violations
and the like.
337. It would seem that it is up to internal forces to decide the government and its form,
as well as issues of secession.
338. This has been defined as peace enforcement by the Secretary General, who postulated
that authority for such forces might be found in article 40. BOUTROs-GHALI, supra note 10.
339. It would seem that, with peace enforcement, the use of force is authorized, although
not the primary component, whereas in enforcement it plays a more prominent role. Enforcement

includes nonforcible measures and thus peace enforcement could easily be included in chapter
VII. Peacekeeping has always required the consent of all of the parties, and force is authorized

only in self-defense.
340. MURPHY, supra note 62, at 17. This distinction was employed in the Congo. Since

force was authorized against an internal faction, it was not the use of force against a State. See
Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20). Selfdefense was also stretched beyond recognition.
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veto-free post-Cold War era, are undertaken only after a great deal of
thought, discussion, and debate. In order to impose peace enforcement,
the debate should take place on the same level as when the Organization
undertakes enforcement, and the necessary forces should have the requisite
support, authority, and direction to actually carry out the mandate of the
Council.
This necessarily entails some degree of consensus, at least among the
fifteen members of the Security Council, and a studied consideration of
the situation before it. It should also include direction from the Council
as to what actions should be undertaken, and the input of the entire
Council in carrying out the mandate. 34 1Requiring the invocation of chapter
VII, where States are more hesitant, would help ensure that there is
consensus for action. This requirement combined with permanent U.N.
forces under U.N. command, would move the Organization towards
multilateral action. This may portend inaction by the Council in certain
situations or perhaps lesser forms of action. There may, however, be more
consensus than might be imagined. That the Council invoked the mandatory measures of chapter VII in setting up UNOSOM II indicates that
the trend is in this direction.342
III. A MORE DEMOCRATIC SECURITY COUNCIL
Some observers have described the post-Cold War world as presenting
a "new world order," a term that has been given different interpretations
by scholars, government officials, and news commentators.34 3 It could be
defined as a new international system versus the Cold War system which
no longer exists; or, it could signify a new form of conflict management
in which the United Nations figures predominantly. 344 The conflict
management paradigm could denote U.S. hegemony, Security Council
hegemony, or true multilateralism led by all organs of the United Nations.345 Under the multilateral approach, the United Nations would not
merely be an instrument of U.S. foreign policy or the policies of the
341. See supra text accompanying note 47.
342. Report of Secretary General S/25354, supra note 186, at 12-13, i 56-57.

343. Arend, supra note 217.
344. Id. at 491.
345. Id. -at 494-95. An example of U.S. hegemony would be the Gulf War where the

United States was a commanding leader. Professor Arend has termed Security Council
hegemony, or more precisely, permanent member hegemony, the concert of Great Powers. An

example of this is the concurrence of the other permanent members in the Gulf War, the
settlement of the Cambodian conflict, and that they have acted as an executive committee. Id.;
see also W. ANDY KNIGHT & MARl YAMASHITA, THE UNITED NATIONS' CONTRIBUTION TO
THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 40-43 (York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1992).

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 15:519

permanent members, but rather would be an instrument of dispute
settlement where each organ plays an appropriate role.346 States would see
the United Nations as a proper forum to address international conflicts;
the Organization would have a revived legitimacy.347 The next Part
discusses the mechanisms that will help ensure that broad support and a
degree of consensus and legitimacy, rather than unadulterated power, drive
the Council's decisions.348
In An Agenda for Peace, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stated:
a genuine sense of consensus deriving from shared interests must
govern the work of Council, not the threat of a veto or the power of
any one group of nations. Moreover, the permanent members must
have the deeper support of other members of the Council, and the
membership more widely, if the Council's decisions are to be
effective and endure.349
This raises a number of issues, such as including more varied voices in
the decision-making process, articulating shared interests and values, and
ensuring that the interests of one or only a few States do not control. A
number of changes will be needed to address these concerns.
A. A More Open and Consistent Decision-Making Process
There have been charges from some quarters that the Security Council
350
and the United States are synonymous. The issue of U.S. dominance
arises from several measures the Council has taken, predominately in Iraq
and Libya, 351 and the concomitant lack of action against U.S. allies, such

346. Arend, supra note 217, at 495; BOUTROS-GHALI, supra note 10.
347. Arend, supra note 217, at 495.

348. There are political obstacles to some of the reforms suggested here, but this should
not prevent us from exploring the possibilities. Especially in this rapidly changing world, it is
conceivable that current political obstacles will unexpectedly dissipate and, as the preceding
discussion illustrates change is in the air. The author agrees with Sir Brian Urquhart who
cautions against the realists and notes that pragmatic dreams, in the long run, are probably the
most practical form of common sense. Brian Urquhart, After the Cold War." Learningfrom the
Gulf in TOWARD COLLECTIVE SECURITY: Two VIEWs 7 (Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Institute for

International Studies, 1991). Professor Thomas Franck notes that realists have been remarkably
unrealistic in their appraisal of prospects for systematic transformation. Thomas Franck, Intervention Against Illegitimate Regimes, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER,

supra note 30, at 159, 167 (1991). Most of the ideas outlined here are sufficiently pragmatic
in the current international milieu.
349. BOUTROs-GHALI, supra note 10, at 15, 78.
350. See Paul Lewis, in Tune Now, U.N. 's Quintet Plays Themes Penned in '45, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at A5, which notes the discomfort of some countries over both U.S.
dominance in the Security Council and the receding frontiers of national sovereignty.
351. See Arend, supra note 217; Paul Lewis, U.N. Again Warns Iraq on Cease Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1992, at Al, A12; Paul Lewis, Isolation of Libya Grows as its Links to World
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as Israel. Some U.S. commentators have gladly proclaimed the new age
of unchallenged U.S. power and dominance, with only a few cautions
' That the United States has often taken
against "imperial temptation."352
the lead role in military actions lends additional credence to these assertions.353
To counter this perception, Security Council decisions must be viewed
as fair, consistent, evenhanded, and in accordance with international law
and the U.N. Charter.354 To begin with, specificity in Security Council
resolutions would be useful. 355 By indicating more specifically the basis
for a particular outcome in a particular case, norms will begin to emerge
on such issues as what constitutes a "threat" to the peace. It would also
be helpful if Council members articulated their views on the record, 356 as
well as solicited and incorporated the views of other interested States and
organizations.357 Again, this would help in beginning to define the
parameters of various terms such as "danger" to the peace.
As norms develop, they must be applied consistently. Thus, human
rights violations and internal conflicts in Northern Ireland, 358 Tibet, 35 9 and

Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1992, at Al, AI0; Julian Ozanne, Quadaffi Regime Seen as Least

of Many Evils, FIN. TIMES (London), May 28, 1992, at 4.
352. Compare Lewis, supra note 350, with ROBERT W. TUCKER &.DAVID HENDRICKS, THE
IMPERIAL TEMPTATION (1992).
353. Steven A. Holmes, U.S. May Send Commanders To Hunt for Somali Warlord, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1993, at Al, A2; Daniel Williams, U.S. Troops to Remain in Somalia, WASH.
POST, Aug. 11, 1993, at Al, A16.
354. That international treaties and obligations were ignored in the case of Libya, made
this case especially difficult. Weller, supra note 4. See also Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14).
355. Many resolutions do rely upon more detailed Secretary General reports. These reports,
however, often do not indicate why, for instance, chapter VI versus chapter VII applies.
356. Thus, the practice of the permanent members acting as a private club taking decisions
in private would have to end.
357. The Security Council routinely hears the views of Member States and regional
organizations that have a particular interest in the matter. U.N. CHARTER arts. 31, 32; BAILEY,
supra note 329, at 33, 395 (discussing Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure).
358. See Myers, supra note 4, at 89-110.
359. Tibet is in the Himalayan region of Western China. It was first brought before the
United Nations when, after the birth of the People's Republic of China, the Tibetan ruler, the
Dalai Lama, demanded (October 7, 1950) a U.N. protectorate over the region. The U.N. General
Assembly General Commission refused to interfere in internal Chinese affairs. Rather, the
Commission hoped for a peaceful Chinese solution of the problem, and an agreement was signed
between the Dalai Lama and Mao-Tse-Tung on May 23, 1951. The matter was brought before
the United Nations again after the Dalai Lama fled to India in March 1959. On October 21,
1959, The General Assembly adopted Resolution 1533 calling for respect for the basic rights
of the Tibetan people, which was confirmed by Resolution 1723 of December 20, 1961, and
Resolution 2079 of December 18, 1965. In 1984, China invited the Dalai Lama to visit Peiping.
EDMUND J. OSMANCZYK,
AGREEMENTS 801 (1985).
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Tiananmen Square36° must be appropriate matters for the Security Council
if it is determined that internal conflicts involving grave human rights
violations are "dangers" or "threats" to the peace, warranting Security
Council intervention.36 ' Resolutions must be enforced against allies and
enemies of Security Council members.362 Once particular norms are
deemed to apply and resolutions are promulgated, resolutions must be
evenly and consistently enforced. Selective enforcement by the Security
Council, especially when it involves the use of force, will undoubtedly
363
raise questions about motives.
As Charter parameters evolve, there must be consensus on the norms
which emerge. This can be achieved in several ways. General Assembly
resolutions and declarations could be useful and instructive. Their nonbinding nature means they would not tie the hands of the Council in any
particular case. 36 Yet attempting to hammer out norms and expectations
would permit and stimulate discussion by the entire international community on what the law is or should be.
B. A Larger and More Diverse Security Council
A number of commentators have been asserting a right to internal
democracy.365 Perhaps this notion of democracy might be applied to the
Security Council. More diverse views would be incorporated into the
decision-making process if the Council had permanent members representing additional regions of the world.366 The five permanent members
were given permanent seats because of their international status following

360. Robert D. McFadden, The West Condemns the Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1989,
at A12; Daniel Southerland, Beijing Residents Resist Army Occupation, WASH. POST, June 5,
1989, at Al; Robert Thompson, Deng passes into history with blood on his hands, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 5, 1989, at A3.
361. Of course, this calls into question the veto, which seems to be the ultimate exercise
of sovereignty. It does seem to be disingenuous to assert that sovereignty is shrinking for all
except those with the power to continue to assert it with the veto. It also seems to indicate,
despite protestations to the contrary, that might does make right.
362. The different standards applied to Israel and Iraq raise questions of legitimacy.
363. With Iraq, it appeared that the United States was using the Council to carry out its
foreign policy aims.
364. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 31; Declaration on Granting
Independence, supra note 110.

365. Franck, IllegitimateRegimes, supra note 348, at 163. Professor Franck contends that
there is an emerging right of the citizens of Member States to participate in their national
governance and this right will be guaranteed by the international community as a global entitlement.
366. See Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the

Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 68th mtg., Item 38, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/PV.68
(1991).
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World War 11.367 This exalted stature and the continued possession of the
veto power over Security Council decisions is now an anachronism for
some, 368 and does not accurately reflect current global distributions of
military and economic power. While military prowess was originally one
of the major defining characteristics, present threats to the peace tend to
be more local and to have their roots in poverty and deprivation. Thus,
it may make sense to consider placing regional and economic superpowers
on the Council.3 69
With the absence of permanent voices for larger powers from the
developing world,37 ° there is a risk that Council decisions will not
adequately take into account the concerns of those countries. 37' Thus the
calls, that have grown into a chorus, for recomposition of the Security
Council can no longer be ignored. A reconfigured Security Council where
the views of more diverse segments of the international community are
represented could be a crucial element in ensuring that Council decisions
are deemed legitimate by Member States.372 While there have been
frequent calls to add specific countries to the Council, 373 one way to avoid
the current situation, of Council Members no longer possessing the
requisite international standing, is to add regional seats which would go
to the largest power in the region. Population, wealth, and other factors

367. White, supra note 37, at 4-5. For a further discussion of the influence of these States
on the development of the United Nations, see CLAUDE, supra note 9, at 62-73.
368. Frequent questions have been raised regarding whether France and the United
Kingdom should retain permanent seats. The weak economic status of the Russian Federation
might also raise questions if it is unable to help fund necessary operations. It does, however,
remain a major military power with an immense nuclear arsenal.
369. Paul Lewis, U.S. to Push Germany and Japanfor U.N. Council, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1993, at A5. There have been many questions raised as to whether Germany and/or Japan,
two economic giants, should have permanent seats. The United States supports their inclusion.
Id; see also Reapportion the Security Council, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at A14; Michael
Littlejohns, U.S. Backs Japanese, German U.N. Bid, FIN. TIMES (London), July 2, 1993, at 5.
The regional powers most often mentioned are Nigeria, India, and Brazil. Lewis, supra at A5.
370. Many of the current members of the United Nations were not States in 1945 and no
consideration was given to the geographic, racial, ethnic, or cultural representation of permanent
members.
371. The permanent membership of the Council is heavily weighted towards Western
Countries, including the most powerful, the United States.
372. Of course, this will still omit smaller States, as well as militarily weak States. Yet
given the role of the Council in maintaining international peace, it seems wise to continue to
include larger, relatively more powerful States as permanent members. All States, at least
theoretically, have the opportunity to be elected to nonpermanent seats. See also Reisman, supra
note 48, at 97-99. Reisman proposes formation of a chapter VII consultation committee to meet
with the Council whenever it goes into a chapter VII decision mode. The Council would share
its views as well as solicit the views and perspectives of this 21 member committee. Id.
373. See Reapportion the Security Council, supra note 369; Littlejohns, supra note 369;
Annika Savill, U.S. Backs Expansion of Security Council; Britain Resists Change that Would
Dilute its PermanentFive Position, INDEPENDENT (London), June 11, 1993, at 11.
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would determine the specific country that occupies a regional seat at any
particular time.374
C. Permanent Forces Under U.N. Command
Finally, in An Agenda for Peace, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali
called for the establishment of readily-available armed forces, on call, as
a means of deterring "breaches" of the peace. Potential aggressors would
know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response, making the
force a deterrent. 37 5 There is already authority in the Charter under article
43, whereby Member States and the United Nations can enter into special
agreements to make armed forces, assistance, and facilities available to
the Security Council for the purposes in article 42 - that is for enforcement. These agreements should be negotiated.376 Forces would be available
on a permanent, rather than on the current ad hoc, basis. These forces
would be for enforcement, not peacekeeping, however, which makes
delineating the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement
377
all the more important.
Any forces that are authorized to use force and are operating without
consent ought properly to be termed enforcement forces and come from
the permanent forces proposed, by the Secretary General. The need for
adequate training, coordination, and discipline have been tragically
illustrated in Somalia.378 This would also mean the United Nations would
have more control over actions taken in its name. The desire for multilateral, versus unilateral, action under a U.N. banner, was demonstrated
during the debates on the U.N. Task Force in Somalia. Many Member
States spoke in favor of increased control by the United Nations over the

374. Size, military strength, gross domestic product, political influence, and strength might
be a few of the factors considered.
375. See BOUTROs-GHALI, supra note 10, at 25.,

376. U.N. CHARTER art. 43. These agreements have never been concluded, primarily
because of Cold War hostilities, although early studies and attempts were made. In BOUTROSGHALI, supra note 10, the Secretary General recommended that the Security Council initiate
negotiations in accordance with article 43, with the support of the Military Staff Committee.
377. Id. Given recent events in Somalia, where U.N. peacekeepers have been attacked and
murdered, and have themselves shot civilians and engaged in retaliatory air strikes and raids,
the necessity of making this distinction and thus insuring that troops are well trained and equipped for a well-defined mandate could not be clearer. See Lucia Mouat, Recruiting Peacekeepers
for High-Stakes Missions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 16, 1993, at 7.
378. The turmoil surrounding Italian forces in Somalia illustrates the need for a strong
mandate and a central command. See S.C. Res. 814, supra note 26; Richard Bernstein, Italian
General Who Refused Order in Somalia is Removed, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1993, at AI0; Alan
Cowell, Italy, in U.N. Rift, Threatens Recall of Somalia Troops, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at
Al; Alan Ferguson, Italy Refuses to Pull General Who Ignored Orders from U.N., TORONTO
STAR, July 17, 1993, at A18.
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Task Force's actions. One of the options presented was a U.N. force under
the control of the Secretary General; this was the preferred option of
many.37 9 Moreover, as in Iraq, that the force was led primarily by one
State, tended to raise questions of legitimacy. An established force would
help put to rest perceptions that the United Nations is acting at the bidding
of a particular State. 380 The U.N. failure to take forceful action in Bosnia
and Hercegovina has been linked to the refusal of the United States and
others to commit ground forces. Since there is no permanent force to fill
the void, the result is no action at all. A U.N. force would also make it
less likely for this result to transpire.
Furthermore, as the United Nations goes into more internal conflicts
where the operations are infinitely more difficult, 38I and sensitivities as
to sovereignty higher, the use of a force trained and operating under U.N.
command would hopefully add to more efficient operations. Given the
increasing danger, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain troops.382
Moreover, the sheer number of U.N. operations necessitates closer
coordination and control.383 Somalia is the first case in which the United
Nations has had command and control of an operation under chapter
VII.384 This indicates that the trend is towards U.N. operations under U.N.
control and that the time has come to. make it a U.N. action under a
proficient, strong, and permanent force.

379. See S/PV.3145, supra note 188. The Secretary General and several States ack-

nowledged however, that the United Nations was not equipped to undertake such a task at the
present time. Still, there was more reporting by UNITAF than any previous force, and there were
many statements in favor of increased control over forces operating under the auspices of the
United Nations.

380. Arend, supra note 217, at 530.
381. Often the mandates are unclear and constantly expanding, while the resources may
not expand in tandem. Because the United Nations does not have permanent forces and must
operate on an ad hoc basis, it may not be able to amass sufficient forces to deal with a particular
crisis. Moreover, it may be dealing with political elements which are not States and do not
respect the U.N. mandate or authority. Paul Lewis, U.N. Is Developing Control Center to
Coordinate Growing Peacekeeping Role, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1993, at A10 (citing the
comments of Undersecretary General Marack Goulding on dealing with despots and warlords
who cannot conclude agreements and how this leads to the use of force).
382. Mouat, supra note 377, at 7; Akhbar Al-Yawn, U.N. Chief Boutros-GhaliContrasts
Somalia, Bosnia, MIDDLE E. NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 26, 1992 (translated from Arabic).
383. As of March 1993, there were 60,000 peacekeepers in the field carrying out thirteen
operations. See Lewis, supra note 364, at A5. This has lead to an overhaul of how these

operations are run and the new command and control center at the United Nations to keep headquarters constantly linked with its numerous peacekeeping operations.
384. This is more comprehensive than the Congo where force was authorized, at least
theoretically, only in self defense. Korea and Iraq were really U.S. actions authorized by the

Organization.
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CONCLUSION

The United Nations will increasingly be called upon to intervene in
internal conflicts. As long as it is summoned by the affected State or that
State consents to the intervention, there will be few problems with
domestic jurisdiction questions and hopefully much to be gained in
resolving disputes. If the United Nations can assist, through peaceful
settlement mechanisms, in ending or preventing the militarization of
conflicts, this will greatly benefit the peoples of the world who are killed,
maimed, and raped in such conflicts, and whose lives are tragically and
permanently disrupted. It is when consent is not forthcoming that we must
carefully review options and creatively promulgate solutions. If there is
a "danger" to the peace, there is international jurisdiction, even if it is only
recommendatory. There is also authority to investigate, albeit with consent.
Given recent events, many parties to internal conflicts, at some stage, will
want to take advantage of the many peaceful settlement mechanisms
available through the United Nations, although the results may not always
be successful.
If peaceful settlement mechanisms fail, the Council has potential
jurisdiction and must decide whether to take recommendatory or mandatory measures; that is, if it is a "danger" or "threat" to the peace. Recent
decisions indicate a large departure from past precedent. In reaching the
minimum finding of "threat" to the peace, which permits the imposition
of mandatory measures which include force, the international community
must begin carefully to appraise whether and when an internal conflict is
a "threat" to the peace and then apply that standard with some consistency.
Given that inter-State conflict is no longer the yardstick, there must be an
honest appraisal of this issue in a reformed system that systematically
takes into account multiple and diverse voices in formulating norms and
includes additional varied perspectives in implementing them. Failure to
do so could eventually lead to a crisis of legitimacy and raise many of the
problems entailed in unilateral intervention.
Currently the international community, often with the very best of
intentions, is groping towards solutions. Given the myriad situations that
may present themselves, there will always be exceptions and we must
allow room for flexibility and innovation. Nonetheless, parameters must
be developed. Clearly, there is some uncertainty; legal standards, which
alone may be insufficient, can at least assist in bringing about some
clarity.
Finally, the United Nations should continue to assume its traditional
role of remaining a neutral party in internal conflicts. While this role has
permitted the Organization to assume multiple and varied functions to
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assist peoples in resolving their differences and deciding upon political
solutions, it has meant not making that decision for them by, for example,
deciding which party is the appropriate party to prevail. To do so severely
risks drawing the United Nations into quagmires where it becomes the
target rather than the mediator. Such action is also of doubtful legality,
given other Charter principles such as self-determination, and will make
States and insurgents less willing to stop fighting and call upon the United
Nations. Despite the sometimes hard choices this may at times entail, in
the long run it will permit the Organization to assist in alleviating many
more conflicts. This would be a step forward for us all.

